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REMOVING THE MASS MISPERCEPTION:  A 
CONSIDERATION OF MASS 
ENVIRONMENTAL TORTS AND REMOVAL 
JURISDICTION UNDER THE CLASS ACTION 
FAIRNESS ACT 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Oil is one of the most constructive resources fueling our everyday 
life—it can also be one of the most destructive.1  On April 20, 2010, at 
approximately 10:00 P.M. CST, the United States experienced one of the 
greatest environmental catastrophes in its history.2  Methane gas from a 
well located on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico 
expanded into a drilling rig, caught fire, and exploded, killing nearly a 
dozen British Petroleum (“BP”) employees and injuring many others.3  
Over the next 87 days, 4.9 billion barrels of oil leaked into the Gulf of 
Mexico, impacting approximately 68,000 square miles of the ocean along 
the Gulf Islands, Intercostal Waterway, Pensacola Beach, and several 
states including Texas, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, and Louisiana.4 
                                                
1 See Alan Neuhauser, Oil Spills Aplenty Since Exxon Valdez, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 25, 2014), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2014/03/25/us-racks-up-dozens-of-oil 
-spills-in-25-years-since-exxon-valdez [https://perma.cc/QR4Q-95NJ] (providing a graphic 
chart of oil spills that have occurred within the United States since the Exxon Valdez disaster 
of March 1989); see also Oil Can Do More, WINTERSHALL, http://www.wintershall.com/en/ 
company/oil-and-gas/oil-can-do-more.html [https://perma.cc/7SGE-3XA6] (explaining 
some of the useful purposes of crude oil).  Crude oil generates heat, fuels our mechanisms of 
travel, and drives our factory machines.  Oil Can Do More, supra note 1.  Day-to-day materials 
such as paints, plastics, detergents, and even some medicine contain components of crude 
oil.  Id. 
2 See The Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill:  The World’s Largest Accidental Offshore Oil, U.N. ENV’T 
PROGRAMME (Aug. 2010), http://na.unep.net/geas/getUNEPPageWithArticleID 
Script.php?article_id=65 [https://perma.cc/RSC6-QZRC] (detailing the facts of the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill); see also Debbie Elliott & Scott Horsley, How an Oil Spill Spread 
into a National Crisis, NPR (May 5, 2010), http://www.npr.org/2010/05/05/126508979/ 
how-an-oil-spill-spread-into-a-national-crisis [https://perma.cc/WBZ5-YARD] (discussing 
the tragic consequences associated with the oil spill). 
3 See Elliot & Horsley, supra note 2 (providing details of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill); 
see also Sharon Dunn, Fracking 101:  Breaking Down the Most Important Part of Today’s Oil, Gas 
Drilling, GREELEY TRIB. (Jan. 5, 2014), http://www.greeleytribune.com/news/9558384-
113/drilling-oil-equipment-wellbore# [https://perma.cc/Z32C-G5RM] (defining a drilling 
rig as a machine used to drill a hole, which is what forms the well for the extraction of natural 
resources such as oil). 
4 See Joel Achenbach & David A. Fahrenthold, Oil Spill Dumped 4.9 Million Barrels into 
Gulf of Mexico, Latest Measure Shows, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.washington 
po st . c o m/ wp -d yn/c o ntent /a rt i c l e/2 0 10 / 08 / 02 / AR2 01 0 0 80 2 04 6 95 . html  
[https://perma.cc/2W53-EXQR] (describing the amount of oil that was spilled during the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill); see also Daniel Gilbert & Sarah Kent, BP Agrees to Pay $18.7 
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On July 3, 2015, the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Louisiana announced BP must pay an additional $18.7 billion in 
settlement fees to the state and federal government, increasing BP’s total 
liability to $53.8 billion for criminal and civil penalties and cleanup costs.5  
However, the sum of $53.8 billion did not include any damages to the 
privately owned businesses that suffered because of the oil spill.6  Under 
the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), these business owners may 
consolidate their claims against BP into one action known as a mass action 
lawsuit.7  If the business owners file their lawsuit against BP in state court, 
then BP has the opportunity to remove the action to federal court.8  These 
small business owners, who may prefer to litigate their case in a state 
court, can then move to remand the case back to state court.9  However, a 
problem arises when the federal court must determine whether it is proper 
                                                
Billion to Settle Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Claims, WALL ST. J. (July 2, 2015) (suggesting the 
states that were impacted by the oil spill). 
5 See Gilbert & Kent, supra note 4 (stating the breakdown of the BP settlement as follows:  
$5.5 billion for violation of the Clean Water Act, $1 billion for 400 local government claims, 
$7.3 billion for the natural resources damages, and $4.9 billion for the 5 state claims). 
6 See id. (providing additional information as to the financial breakdown of British 
Petroleum’s (“BP”) settlement as a result of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill); see also Tourism 
Industry Impacts:  The Deepwater Horizon Spill, CONVERSATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENVTL. DEV. 
(July 1, 2010), http://credbc.ca/tourism-industry-impacts-the-deepwater-horizon-spill/ 
[https://perma.cc/9RXJ-Q9HP] [hereinafter CRED] (discussing the impact of the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill on local businesses).  Due to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill 
and the potential safety risks of areas that were harmed, the tourism industry in states such 
as Louisiana suffered.  CRED, supra note 6.  According to the Louisiana Office of Tourism, 
twenty-six percent of individuals who intended to visit Louisiana had cancelled or 
postponed their trips.  Id.  The hospitality industry across the states of Louisiana, Alabama, 
Mississippi, and Florida experienced an increase in cancellations of reservations by sixty 
percent, as well as forty-two percent more difficulty in booking future events.  Id.  Over 7.3 
million businesses throughout Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas were 
harmed as a result of the oil spill that affected 34.4 million employees and cost $5.2 trillion 
in sales volume.  Id.  The Institute for Business and Home Safety estimated twenty-five 
percent of the businesses that were harmed from a major disaster did not reopen.  Id. 
7 See Annika K. Martin, In re:  Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of 
Mexico, LIEFF, CABRASER, HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN ATT’YS AT L. (2016), http://www.lieff 
cabraser.com/Case-Center/BP-Gulf-Oil-Spill.shtml [https://perma.cc/W5AD-DU9D] 
(contributing a list of the lawsuits brought by private property owners against BP). 
8 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii) (2012) (explaining when a mass action constitutes a 
class action under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”)); see also § 1332(d)(4) (providing 
the requirements for when a district court must refuse to exercise jurisdiction over a class 
action). 
9 See § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I) (allowing mass actions to be remanded to state court if the 
claims of the parties arise from the same event or occurrence).  The exception preventing the 
removal of a mass action where all the claims arise out of the same event or occurrence under 
the CAFA is known as the single local event exception.  Id. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 51, No. 1 [2016], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol51/iss1/6
2016] Mass Misperception 163 
to grant the motion to remand the case back to state court.10  A mass action 
may be remanded back to the state court under the single local event 
exception if the parties’ claims arise out of the same event or occurrence.11  
Currently, the CAFA does not provide a clear definition of what 
constitutes the same event or occurrence for the purposes of the single 
local event exception; thus, many courts waste valuable time litigating this 
issue, which produces inconsistent results.12  As a result, the CAFA 
standard fails to promote the common principles of allocating past losses, 
minimizing or potentially preventing future accidents, and discouraging 
classes of people from engaging in conduct that poses an excessive risk of 
personal injury or property damage.13 
To provide a clear interpretation of the single local event exception, 
this Note proposes a four-factor test for the federal courts to implement, 
which will remove the vague standard of what is considered the same 
event or occurrence for the purpose of remanding a mass action back to 
state court.14  First, Part II discusses the characteristics of toxic torts and 
environmental torts by looking at the recent court cases that caused a 
three-way circuit split when trying to define the same event or 
occurrence.15  Then, Part III analyzes the problem with the current circuit 
split and argues courts need to adopt a clear standard for the single local 
event exception.16  Next, Part IV, for public policy reasons, proposes the 
SORT Test and suggests that the federal courts implement this test.17  
                                                
10 See § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii) (discussing when a mass action is able to be remanded back to 
state court). 
11 See § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I) (exploring the jurisdiction of class actions and mass actions of 
the CAFA); see also § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii) (defining mass action and explaining a mass action is 
removable as a class action under the CAFA); Martin, supra note 7 (providing a list of cases 
where private property owners brought a suit against BP); infra Part II (discussing generally 
the problem with removal jurisdiction of mass actions under the CAFA). 
12 See infra Part III (analyzing the effects of not having a clear definition of the same event 
or occurrence under the single local event exception, taking into consideration the 
characteristics of environmental toxic tort claims). 
13 See infra Part III (arguing it is good public policy to deter accidents and prevent harm); 
see also Ronald A. Cass, Ignorance of the Law:  A Maxim Reexamined, 17 WM. & MARY 671, 671 
(1976) (stating that the Latin phrase ignorantia juris non exusat translates to ignorance of the 
law excuses no one).  To uphold this legal principle, courts should provide clear guidelines 
for the parties to understand.  Cass, supra note 13, at 671. 
14 See infra Part IV (proposing the SORT Test, a balancing test for courts to adopt).  This 
Note focuses on the three-way circuit split for determining what constitutes “the same event 
or occurrence” under the CAFA for the removal of mass environmental torts.  See infra Part 
II (discussing toxic tort litigation). 
15 See infra Part II (considering the characteristics of toxic environmental torts and general 
tort public policy). 
16 See infra Part III (evaluating the three-way circuit split and arguing that for public policy 
reasons the circuit split needs to be resolved). 
17 See infra Part IV (proposing a four-factor test and evaluating it). 
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Finally, Part V concludes by reiterating the importance of establishing a 
clear standard for the single local event exception under the CAFA.18 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Chief Judge Howard Thomas Markey of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated “[t]he differences between the 
judicial and the scientific-technological processes are profound and 
pervasive.  Failure to recognize that difference has led to judicial 
expressions of frustration and an unfortunate tendency to rest judicial 
decisions on current, and often transient, ‘truths’ and ‘facts’ of science and 
technology.”19  The fact specific nature of environmental toxic torts along 
with complicated scientific concepts produce vague standards; therefore, 
the standards are impossible to apply accurately and consistently.20  As 
such, the issue of whether a mass environmental tort action falls under an 
exception of the CAFA, specifically the same event or occurrence 
exception, is challenging to litigate and one the American court system 
struggles to evaluate.21 
Ultimately, the courts have failed to determine one concise and 
cohesive standard to apply to the single local event exception.22  Allen v. 
The Boeing Company created a three-way circuit split between the Third, 
Ninth, and Fifth Circuits and demonstrated the inconsistency of 
determining the issue of what constitutes the same event or occurrence for 
                                                
18 See infra Part V (summarizing the need for courts to have a single standard for the single 
local event exception under the CAFA). 
19 Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 593 A.2d 733, 741 (N.J. 1991). 
20 See infra Part II.A.1 (evaluating the characteristics of environmental torts); infra Part 
III.A (addressing how the characteristics of environmental torts apply to scientific 
knowledge). 
21 See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 554 (2014) (stating 
that there is no anti-removal presumption for a removal action in the CAFA); Benko v. 
Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 789 F.3d 1111, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that the District 
Court abused its discretion and the plaintiffs met the burden of proving their class action 
claim fell within the single local event exception); Mondragon v. Capital One Auto Fin., 736 
F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2013) (discussing one of the other requirements of the single local event 
exception regarding the diversity of citizenship of the plaintiffs); Coleman v. Estes Express 
Lines, Inc., 631 F.3d 1010, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2011) (reasoning that a diversity class action 
should be remanded from the federal court back to the state court when two of the criteria 
for the single local event exception were not met).  Each of these cases provide some insight 
into every aspect of the single local event exception under the CAFA; however, for purposes 
of this Note, the approach is very narrow and looks at only one aspect of the single local 
event exception, which is the same event or occurrence requirement. 
22 See infra Part III.A (analyzing the problems with the vague approach to resolving the 
issue of removal jurisdiction for mass environmental torts under the CAFA). 
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the purposes of removal jurisdiction of mass actions under the CAFA.23  
First, Part II.A examines toxic environmental torts and the hurdles parties 
encounter when litigating toxic tort cases.24  Next, Part II.B evaluates mass 
actions and removal jurisdiction under the same event or occurrence 
language of the CAFA.25  Finally, Part II.C provides the relevant 
information pertaining to the circuit split in the Third, Ninth, and Fifth 
Circuits.26 
A. A General Overview of Mass Environmental Torts and Tort Public Policy 
The resulting harm caused by environmental torts differs from case to 
case; therefore, lawsuits involving toxic torts tend to be more fact 
specific.27  The fact specific nature associated with mass toxic and 
environmental torts makes it challenging for courts to interpret the same 
event or occurrence exception under the CAFA using traditional methods 
of judicial interpretation.28  Part II.A.1 provides the relevant characteristics 
                                                
23 See infra Part II.C (discussing the facts and rulings of the recent cases from the Third, 
Ninth, and Fifth Circuits); see also Tom Cummins & Adam Aft, Appellate Review, 2 J. OF L.:  A 
PERIODICAL LAB. OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 59, 60–61, 63–65 (2012) (exploring the characteristics 
of circuit splits and ultimately measuring circuit court performance based on the resolutions 
of circuit splits).  A circuit split exists when a federal court of appeals decides a case that 
conflicts with the decision of another federal court of appeals.  Cummins & Aft, supra note 
23, at 60. 
24 See infra Part II.A (evaluating the characteristics of toxic torts and how their 
characteristics can challenge the promotion of general tort public policy). 
25 See infra Part II.B (considering the characteristics of mass torts under the CAFA and the 
vague language used within the CAFA causing problems for the courts when interpreting 
the legislation). 
26 See infra Part II.C (providing the relevant facts and holdings to each of the cases in the 
Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits). 
27 See infra Part II.A (reviewing the characteristics of toxic torts); see also Dan Tarlock, Is 
There a There There in Environmental Law?, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 213, 222 (2004) (stating 
that environmental law is defined as “a synthesis of pre-environmental era common law 
rules, principles from other areas of law, and post-environmental era statutes . . . and other 
areas of science, economics[,] and ethics”).  To exemplify the factual context of environmental 
torts, consider this metaphor to the medical field written solely by the author.  Much like a 
doctor considers a list of symptoms to determine a diagnosis, a judge must listen to the 
specific facts of a case to decide a ruling.  In the medical field, the symptoms in one patient 
may not heed the same ailment in another patient, and this is the case in environmental torts.  
Each environmental tort is different, brought about by a unique set of facts and 
circumstances, each with a different chemical makeup of hazardous material that may 
impact the environment, the people, and businesses around them differently. 
28 See Joey Senat, Methods of Judicial Interpretation, OKLA. ST. U. (June 21, 2013), 
https://media.okstate.edu/faculty/jsenat/jb3163/methods.html [https://perma.cc/ 
H4ZS-9ZJN] (explaining the different types of judicial interpretation).  The different methods 
of judicial interpretation are:  literalism, original intent, doctrinal approach, and 
structuralism.  Id.  Each method of interpretation has its advantages and disadvantages.  Id.  
Under the literalism method, the judge will look to the literal text of the document, using no 
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of toxic environmental torts.29  Part II.A.2 discusses general tort public 
policy as applicable to toxic tort characteristics.30 
1. The Nexus of Toxic Torts and Environmental Torts 
An individual files a toxic tort lawsuit when a hazardous material 
causes harm to the individual or his or her property.31  Whereas, an 
                                                
external sources as support.  Id.  While literalism removes the possibility of misinterpretation 
of the law, the literalism approach is challenging when there is any ambiguity or imprecise 
language.  Id.  Lack of specificity exists under the current interpretation of the CAFA.  Id.  
Under the original intent method, the court looks to the historic basis of the document to 
determine what the purpose of the law is and what the drafters intended the law to mean.  
Senat, supra note 28.  The original intent approach provides a basis to begin when 
unanticipated circumstances arise, which is applicable to the problem with the CAFA.  Id.  
The doctrinal approach is also known by the Latin phrase of stare decisis, which translates to 
“let the decision stand.”  Id.  This means new cases should be decided the same way as old 
cases, so long as the facts are similar.  Id.  This approach has not been successfully applied to 
the issue of removal jurisdiction because currently there are three different holdings on what 
is considered the same event or occurrence under the CAFA.  Id.  The final method of judicial 
interpretation is structuralism, which considers the larger relationship within the document, 
not its specific provisions.  Id.  For example, for removal jurisdiction, the judges would look 
to the whole document of the CAFA, not just the section discussing mass actions as class 
actions for the purposes of removal using structuralism.  Senat, supra note 28.  This approach 
tends to be more problematic and likely will not apply in the interpretation of the CAFA for 
this Note because it provides a more subjective and abstract approach.  Id.  See also infra Part 
II (evaluating the characteristics of environmental torts); infra Part III.A (addressing how the 
characteristics of environmental torts apply to scientific knowledge). 
29 See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the characteristics of toxic torts and explaining how the 
unique characteristics of toxic torts relate to the problem of removal jurisdiction of mass 
actions under the CAFA). 
30 See infra Part II.A.2 (providing the public policy surrounding issues involving torts and 
toxic torts and explaining how the circuit split does not promote sound tort public policy). 
31 See L. Neal Ellis, Jr., Introduction, in TOXIC TORT LITIGATION 2 (D. Alan Rudlin ed., 2007) 
(explaining what toxic torts are and are not); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (2012) (describing a 
hazardous substance).  The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act (“CERCLA”) is codified in the United States Code under 42 U.S.C. § 9601.  
§ 9601.  CERCLA defines a hazardous substance as: 
[A]ny substance designated pursuant to section 311(b)(2)(A) of the 
Federal Water Pollution Act [33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A)], (B) any element, 
compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to 
section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having the 
characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the 
Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 6921] (but not including any 
waste the regulation of which under the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 
U.S.C.A. § 6901 et seq.] has been suspended by Act of Congress), (D) any 
toxic pollutant listed under section 307(a) of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act [33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)], (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed 
under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 7412], and (F) any 
imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to 
which the Administrator has taken action pursuant to section 7 of the 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 51, No. 1 [2016], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol51/iss1/6
2016] Mass Misperception 167 
environmental tort claim is filed when the harm results from a hazardous 
substance that impacts the environment and characteristically violates a 
federal statute.32  Environmental torts can become toxic torts when a toxic 
substance detrimentally affects both the environment and an individual 
or their land.33  Traditionally, environmental tort cases contain more 
hurdles for the plaintiff to overcome than a normal tort case, such as 
negligence or battery.34  Courts review environmental torts under a 
                                                
Toxic Substances Control Act [15 U.S.C. § 2606].  The term does not 
include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is 
not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance 
under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term 
does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, 
or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such 
synthetic gas). 
Id.  Although crude oil is not defined as a hazardous substance under CERCLA, it is 
considered hazardous by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) 
Hazard Communication Standard.  Material Safety Data Sheet Crude Oil, TESORO (Feb. 1, 
2011), https://tsocorpsite.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/crude-oil-generic.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WJE2-D73T]; see also Kenneth S. Abraham, Cleaning up the Environmental 
Liability Insurance Mess, 27 VAL. U. L. REV. 601, 602–03 (1993) (discussing liability for 
environmental torts under CERCLA).  CERCLA is an environmental statute designed to 
accomplish the cleanup of hazardous materials through “the expenditure of cleanup costs 
from a fund (hence the name ‘Superfund’) raised through a series of different taxes” and 
through the “imposition of liability for the cost of cleanup on the ‘responsible parties.’”  
Abraham, supra note 31, at 602–03. 
32 See Note, Causation in Environmental Law:  Lessons from Toxic Torts, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
2256, 2256 (2015) (evaluating and contrasting environmental law and toxic torts). 
33 See Ben A. Franklin, Toxic Cloud Leaks at Carbide Plant in West Virginia, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
12, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/08/12/us/toxic-cloud-leaks-at-carbide-plant-in-
west-virginia.html [https://perma.cc/Q99X-Y6YW] (exemplifying a situation where 
environmental and toxic torts collided).  On August 11, 1985, a Union Carbide Corporation 
plant in West Virginia released aldicarb oxime, a chemical, which when combined with 
methyl isocyanate, creates a compound used in pesticides.  Id.  Because of this incident, 135 
residents of Charleston, West Virginia were treated for eye, throat, and lung irritation, and 
twenty-eight individuals were admitted to a hospital near the Union Carbide plant.  Id.  The 
leak lasted about fifteen minutes and resulted from a failed gasket on a 500-gallon storage 
tank that contained the aldicarb oxime.  Id.  Broadcasts encouraged residents to stay inside 
and turn off their air conditioning and other forms of ventilation to prevent the chemical 
from traveling indoors.  Id.  This incident exemplifies how a chemical that harms the 
environment, in this case, the air, can also harm individuals within the surrounding 
communities, interlinking both environmental law and toxic torts.  Id. 
34 See Albert C. Lin, Beyond Tort:  Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic Injury, 78 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1439, 1445–46 (2005) (arguing that for a tort system to return a fair recovery of 
damages, judges must adjudicate cases individually based on their specific facts).  Two 
common hurdles in toxic tort litigation are accounting for the latency period for the harm to 
appear within the plaintiff and proving that the defendant actually caused the harm.  Id. at 
1445.  There tends to be more hurdles for a plaintiff in an environmental tort case because 
unlike a tort case, such as battery, where cause and effect is readily identifiable, the cause 
and effect in environmental tort cases can be less apparent.  Id. at 1441–42.  As such, the 
plaintiff in an environmental tort case has more “formidable problems of proof.”  Id. at 1445. 
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negligence standard rather than a strict liability standard, and thus the 
plaintiff must prove issues of causation and a high latency of harm.35  
Toxic torts differ from other types of civil litigation in many key ways, 
which cause challenges during litigation.36  These characteristics need to 
be acknowledged because they play a significant role in the concept of 
removal jurisdiction for mass environmental actions under the CAFA.37 
First, plaintiffs have difficulty identifying the defendant(s) 
responsible for their harm because environmental toxic torts typically 
involve numerous plaintiffs and defendants, unlike other areas of tort 
                                                
35 See id. (discussing the standard of review for environmental torts); see also Bill Charles 
Wells, The Grin without the Cat:  Claims for Damages from Toxic Exposure without Present Injury, 
18 WM. & MARY J. OF ENVTL. L. 285, 288–90 (1994) (addressing the characteristics of the harm 
that can be caused by toxic torts).  In a latency period, the full effect of the exposure to the 
hazardous material is not immediately apparent.  Id. at 288–90.  Thus, the resulting harm 
suffered by the plaintiff may be delayed, and this ultimately creates a problem with the 
elements of causation and resulting harm, unlike a normal tort action.  Id. at 289.  See also 
Alani Golanski, General Causation at a Crossroads in Toxic Tort Cases, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 479, 
481 (2003) (considering the element of causation necessary to recover damages in a toxic tort 
lawsuit).  Some latency effects are:  cancers, birth defects, and other life altering diseases.  Id. 
at 481.  See also CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2191 (2014) (discussing the delay 
in detecting a harm caused by latency periods).  The delay can range from as little as ten 
years to as many as thirty years or more.  Id.  A clear standard would help ensure that those 
plaintiffs who have a latency period associated with their injury may have a successful 
lawsuit against the defendant who caused their harm.  Id. 
36 See Wells, supra note 35, at 288–90 (providing the four characteristics of environmental 
torts).  Toxic torts differ from other types of torts in four ways:  toxic torts involve a large 
number of plaintiffs and defendants, toxic torts have challenges in identifying the source of 
harm, the litigation procedure surrounding toxic torts is complex, and scientific evidence is 
used to resolve causation issues.  Id. 
37 See id. (suggesting the four characteristics of environmental torts that can make mass 
tort litigation challenging); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012) (providing the requirements for 
the removal of civil actions).  In general, environmental torts are civil actions because they 
do not have a criminal aspect to the claim.  § 1441.  Removal jurisdiction is a situation where 
a defendant to a civil action filed in a state court may motion to have the matter litigated in 
federal court.  Id.  See Jeffrey S. Gutman, Removal Jurisdiction, FED. PRAC. MANUAL FOR LEGAL 
AID ATT’Y (2015), http://federalpracticemanual.org/node/14 [https://perma.cc/49WY-
TWSX] (examining the general overview of removal jurisdiction to federal courts).  When an 
issue of removal arises, courts consider whether the federal court could have initially 
exercised jurisdiction over the case.  Id.  Federal courts have original jurisdiction over class 
actions.  Id.  The problem arises when courts deem a mass action a class action.  Id.  Under 
the CAFA, a mass action is not a class action when the claims of the plaintiffs arise out of the 
same event or occurrence.   § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I).  Thus, the mass action is not removable to 
federal court as a class action.  Id.  Another problem arises when determining the definition 
of the same event or occurrence for removal jurisdiction of mass actions.  See infra Part II 
(explaining the relevant background information surrounding the same event or 
occurrence); infra Part II.B (discussing the CAFA, why it was ratified, and the problems with 
the current context of the act). 
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law.38  As such, federal and state courts have implemented different 
causation tests to determine the proportion of liability each defendant 
shares.39  In addition, due to the multiparty claims and the difficulty 
proving causation, the litigation of environmental toxic torts 
characteristically results in complex procedures.40  Thus, courts will not 
consolidate cases if doing so will result in a delay or any unnecessary 
burdens on the parties.41 
                                                
38 See Ellis, supra note 31, at 7 (explaining the challenge of identifying defendants in toxic 
tort cases).  Multiparty lawsuits, if they involve an exceedingly large number of plaintiffs or 
defendants, can be a mass action and classified as a class action.  Id.  This allows federal 
courts to have jurisdiction over the mass action because class actions fall under federal court 
jurisdiction.  Id.  See also Carol M. Rice, Meet John Doe:  It Is Time for Federal Civil Procedure to 
Recognize John Doe Parties, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 883, 885, 887–89 (1996) (addressing the need to 
find a proper way to litigate a claim with a fictitious defendant).  The unique nature of 
environmental toxic torts may also raise the issue of a fictitious defendant.  Id.  A fictitious 
defendant is a situation where a party suing is not sure whether there are unknown persons 
involved in a suit.  Id. at 885.  Typically, these unknown defendants get fake names, such as 
John Doe and Jane Doe.  Id.  Traditionally, for many types of torts, the statute of limitations 
is relatively short which pressures the plaintiff seeking to recover to file his or her complaint.  
Id. at 887–88.  This theory of a fictitious defendant is a tactic used to preserve the limitation 
period for the plaintiff, and with leave of court, the name can later be amended to include 
the defendants who have been identified.  Id. at 888–89. 
39 See Antony Honoré, Causation in the Law, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2010), 
http://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-law [https://perma.cc/9V36-NEKT] 
(discussing the concept of causation in a tort claim).  Causation may be broken down into 
two classes of theories:  the cause-in-fact theory and the criteria for determining 
responsibility for causing the harm.  Id.  Compare Ravo v. Rogatnick, 514 N.E.2d 1104, 1106 
(N.Y. App. Ct. 1987) (holding that when two or more tortfeasors act together to produce one 
single injury suffered by the plaintiff, those defendants may be held jointly and severally 
liable), with Suria v. Shiffman, 490 N.E.2d 832, 837 (1986) (“[W]hen two tortfeasors neither 
act in concert nor contribute concurrently to the same wrong, they are not joint tortfeasors; 
rather, their wrongs are independent and successive.”). 
40 See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (stating if actions before the court involve a common question 
of law or fact, the court may: consolidate actions, join for a hearing any or all matters at issue 
in the action, or enter any other orders to avoid unnecessary costs or delays); see also Debra 
Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 335 (2006) (considering the common 
problem of forum shopping that is prevalent in complex litigation); Friedrich K. Juenger, 
Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553, 553–57 (1989) (explaining 
forum shopping in both domestic and international lawsuits and evaluating the reasons why 
parties may opt to forum shop); see also Complex Litigation Resource Guide, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. 
CTS. (2015), http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Civil/Complex-Litigation/Resource-Guide.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/ZXA9-C7VL] (providing that mass torts and class actions are two types 
of complex litigation). 
41 See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (giving the rule for consolidation of a claim).  Consolidation is 
a way to join claims of parties that involve a common question of law or fact for a joint 
hearing or trial.  Id.  If combining the claims would create prejudice or if it more effective to 
hold separate trials, the court may also order separate trials for any issues, claims, 
crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.  FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b).  See also Shump v. 
Balka, 574 F.2d 1341, 1344 (10th Cir. 1978) (supporting the district court’s decision to 
consolidate as is within its discretion). 
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Another characteristic of toxic tort litigation is that toxic torts tend to 
be driven by science and require that the parties, jury, and judge be able 
to rely on, interpret, and understand grandiose scientific concepts used as 
evidence to prove the resulting harm.42  As a result, courts must determine 
the effects that exposure to chemicals unknown to the average citizen, 
such as asbestos, benzene, and dioxins, have on the plaintiff.43  For 
example, when adjudicating a toxic tort claim, courts evaluate the 
plaintiff’s exposure to the toxin and whether the injury was a result of the 
exposure to the toxin.44  A plaintiff must establish that the substance is 
capable of causing the injury at issue and the exposure to the substance is, 
in fact, what caused the injury.45  Finally, to prove these two issues, courts 
must not only understand whether a particular substance can cause the 
resulting harm, but also determine the harm suffered by the plaintiff.46  
Litigants prove the factual standings through scientific mechanisms such 
                                                
42 See Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1197 (11th Cir. 2002) (viewing toxic 
tort litigation as a subset of products liability holding that “cases . . . are won or lost on the 
strength of the scientific evidence presented to prove causation”); see also infra Part III.A 
(analyzing the problem of the need to apply scientific reasoning to toxic tort litigation). 
43 See Note, supra note 32, at 2256–57 (2015) (discussing the causal link of an actor’s 
negligent behavior and the resulting harm inflicted on another).  In all tort claims there are 
common features of liability and causation.  Id.  Causation provides many problems in 
environmental tort litigation; however, there are some factors of tort claims that are relevant 
only to certain areas of tort law.  Id.  Environmental torts and toxic torts treat causation 
differently, creating the challenge of determining whether the harmful substance directly 
caused the resulting harm suffered by the plaintiff.  Id. at 2257.  Also, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence state: 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise 
if:  (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the 
expert has reliably applied the principles and methods of the facts of the 
case. 
FED. R. EVID. 702 (2014).  See also Robert L. Rabin, Tort Law in Transition:  Tracing the Patterns 
of Sociolegal Change, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 15–20 (1988) (exploring the concerns associated with 
mass litigation and the new characteristics associated with mass torts). 
44 See J. Michael Veron, The Trial of Toxic Torts:  Scientific Evidence in the Wake of Daubert, 
57 LA. L. REV. 647, 647–48 (1997) (evaluating how the litigation procedure of toxic torts has 
changed since Daubert); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 579–80 
(1993) (holding that the Federal Rules of Evidence successfully limit and interpret how 
scientific evidence is to be used to prove causation). 
45 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579–80 (providing the standard for judges to consider scientific 
evidence); see also Lin, supra note 34, at 1446–47 (explaining the elements necessary to 
establish a toxic tort claim as the plaintiff and what evidence is needed to bring a toxic tort 
claim). 
46 See Lin, supra note 34, at 1447 (considering the duties of the court when evaluating and 
adjudicating a toxic tort claim). 
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as epidemiology.47  The use of scientific evidence contributes to the overall 
problem because it requires judges to handle highly technical, factual 
issues that may have no set scientific conclusion, which influences the 
ruling and the consistency of the rulings.48  In contrast, other areas of tort 
                                                
47 See Melissa Moore Thompson, Causal Interference in Epidemiology:  Implications for Toxic 
Tort Litigation, 71 N.C. L. REV. 247, 249–50 (1992) (exploring the causal connection of 
epidemiology and how it relates to toxic tort litigation); see also Stephanie A. Scharf, 
Introduction, in The Use of Epidemiology in Tort Litigation 2–3 n.5 (2007), 
http://www.schoeman.com/assets/pdf/scharf/The_Use_of_Epidemiology_in_Tort_Litig
ation_Introduction.pdf [https://perma.cc/RH5B-ARXM] (introducing epidemiology and its 
use in tort litigation).  Epidemiology is “the science concerned with the study of the factors 
determining and influencing the frequency and distribution of disease, injury, and other 
health-related events and their causes in a defined human population . . . .”  Scharf, supra 
note 47, at 2.  Epidemiology melds the worlds of the hard sciences and statistics to determine 
the relationship between exposure to a substance and the resulting injury.  Id.  Scharf 
provides an example illustrating this relationship: 
An investigator may measure and correlate a range of background 
characteristics (e.g., gender, left-handedness, family history of breast 
cancer, low income); exposures (e.g., smoking, workplace chemicals, x-
ray, pharmaceuticals, Agent Orange); and positive or negative health 
consequences (e.g., lung cancer, depression, infertility, Hepatitis C, 
efficacy of the vaccine, lower risk of hypertension, AIDS, obesity).  
Sometimes a characteristic does not neatly fall into one or the other 
category, e.g., obesity may be a family characteristic as well as a health 
consequence. 
Id. at 3.  See also Robert F. Blomquist, American Toxic Tort Law:  An Historical Background, 1979–
87, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 85, 86, 88–90, 94 (1992) (providing a detailed explanation of toxic 
torts and the litigation procedure within American law).  Epidemiology allows evidence to 
be used to assist the judge with understanding how the resulting harm impacts the health 
and welfare of the parties involved and considering how hazardous substances affect the 
human body.  Id.  at 89–119.  See also Note, supra note 32, at 2268–69 (providing the scientific 
implications of toxic torts).  The causation issue involved in toxic torts can result in 
discrepancies.  Id. at 2268–71.  One problem involved with litigating these issues is, as science 
continually advances, there is more research that may change a ruling in the future.  Id. at 
2271.  See also infra Part IV.A (suggesting a four factor test for courts to adopt). 
48 See Note, supra note 32, at 2270 (discussing judges’ abilities to litigate technical issues); 
see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177–78 (1803) (explaining the duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is); United States v. Diallo, 575 F.3d 252, 256–57 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(stating that when looking to determine the scope of a statute, one must look to the ordinary 
meaning in the language of the statute); Lark Latham et al., The Intersection of Tort and 
Environmental Law:  Where the Twains Should Meet and Depart, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 737, 740–
45 (Nov. 2011) (analyzing the gap between tort common law and recent legislative 
developments to provide remedies to individuals who suffer environmental harm); Frank C. 
Newman, How Courts Interpret Regulations, 35 CALIF. L. REV 509, 512–13 (Dec. 1947) 
(evaluating how judges and courts interpret regulations).  Because of ambiguities in 
legislation that have raised legal issues for courts to resolve and because of the public policy 
of respecting the other branches of government, this circuit split should be resolved.  Id.  
Judges have become a beacon for interpreting and resolving those issues.  Id.  Because judges’ 
opinions are highly regarded, it is imperative that they properly interpret the law to promote 
justice in the judicial system.  Id.  Newman, when discussing the value of judges’ opinions 
stated: 
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law rarely have technical disputes regarding causation between the 
defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury.49 
Each of the aforementioned problems have the underlying component 
of causation.50  Causation is problematic for the plaintiff in environmental 
toxic tort lawsuits because the plaintiff usually cannot draw a direct causal 
connection between the defendant’s activity and the injury alleged.51  
                                                
Judges’ opinions are emphasized, not because they are more correct or 
socially significant than, say, the opinions of government officials or 
Wall Street lawyers, but because they are authoritative.  Since they are 
authoritative, government officials, Wall Street lawyers[,] and anyone 
else who would acquire expertness in this field must know their 
framework and their logic. 
Id.  See also infra Part II.C (discussing the problem with the circuit splits). 
49 See Robert F. Blomquist, Emerging Themes and Dilemmas in American Toxic Tort Law, 
1988–91:  A Legal-Historical and Philosophical Exegesis, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 25 (1993) (exploring 
the evaluation of American toxic tort law in relation to the nature and limitations of toxic tort 
liability).  The area of torts and causation is highly contested and continually debated.  Id.  
See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 18 (2010) 
(evaluating the liability of a defendant in a tort lawsuit).  A defendant who knows or has 
reason to know of a risk that may occur from his or her conduct, and fails to warn of the 
danger may be liable.  Id.  If the defendant does adequately warn the plaintiff of the risk, it 
is possible that the defendant may still be held liable if the defendant fails to adopt further 
precautions to protect against the risk if the risk is foreseeable.  Id.  The Restatement is 
directly applicable to the section discussing the contribution on liability for mass action 
lawsuits regarding environmental toxic torts.  Id.  “If an actor has skills or knowledge that 
exceed those possessed by most others, these skills or knowledge are circumstances to be 
taken into account in determining whether the actor has behaved as a reasonably careful 
person.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 12 (2010).  See also Garratt 
v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1092–93 (Wash. 1955) (exemplifying the tort of battery and how 
there was no issues of causation).  In this case, a child defendant pulled a chair out from 
underneath the plaintiff as she was about to sit.  Id. at 1092.  As a result, the plaintiff suffered 
a severely injured hip.  Id.  In cases like this, where the defendant pulling the chair from 
underneath the plaintiff directly caused the plaintiff to suffer a broken hip, courts do not 
have to waste judicial resources litigating the causation element of negligence.  Id. at 1093. 
50 See Blomquist, supra note 49, 25–28 n.158, 30–31 n.169–71, 33–34, 36–37 (discussing the 
issues of causation within toxic torts).  Due to the problems with drawing a causal connection 
between the source of the harm, the harm that resulted, and the impact of the harm, it makes 
it challenging for courts to promote tort policies that seek to benefit the public.  VINCENT R. 
JOHNSON, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 6–7, (Gary J. Simson et al. eds., 5th ed. 2013). 
51 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 583 (1993) (discussing the issue 
of whether expert scientific testimony is admissible in toxic tort proceedings).  Due to the 
problem of drawing a direct causal connection between the toxic substance and the resulting 
harm, plaintiffs often rely on expert scientific testimony to help develop their proof.  Id. at 
582.  One famous toxic tort case surrounding expert testimony is Daubert, where petitioners 
sued for birth defects suffered by their children as a result of the mother ingesting Bendectin.  
Id.  Bendectin is a prescription antinausea drug marketed by the respondent of the suit.  Id.  
After extensive discovery, the respondent moved for summary judgment, arguing the drug, 
Bendectin, did not cause the birth defects and claimed the petitioners would not be able to 
provide any admissible evidence that proves otherwise.  Id.  The respondent presented an 
expert who reviewed the literature on Bendectin and could not find any correlation between 
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Without knowing the cause of the harm, it is nearly impossible to 
determine whether the environmental toxic torts arose out of the same 
event or occurrence.52 
2. Tort Public Policy 
Like much of tort law, the public policy surrounding environmental 
torts cannot be defined by a succinct objective or goal.53  General tort 
public policy has been known for compensating those who have been 
detrimentally impacted by the act of another.54  Nine of the twelve general 
tort public policies are applicable to mass environmental torts and can be 
categorized into three purposes:  (1) to hold one liable based on their 
                                                
the drug and birth defects among 130,000 human patients, and because of this testimony, the 
petitioners presented their own expert who claimed that Benedictine could create birth 
defects based on the testing of “in vitro” and “in vivo” animal studies.  Id.  Both the District 
Court and Court of Appeals, relying on the case of Frye v. United States, held that the 
petitioners’ evidence did not meet the standard of admissible evidence.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 
583–84.  However, the Supreme Court held that the rule in Frye of “general acceptance” does 
not govern the admissibility of expert scientific evidence.  Id. at 589.  “General acceptance” 
was a standard for admitting expert testimony that required “a well-recognized scientific 
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently 
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”  
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. App. Ct. 1923).  However, Daubert overturned 
this holding.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587–88.  The Supreme Court in Daubert stated “nothing in 
the text of this Rule establishes ‘general acceptance’ as an absolute prerequisite to 
admissibility.  Nor does respondent present any clear indication that Rule 702 or the Rules 
as a whole were intended to incorporate a ‘general acceptance’ standard.”  Id. at 588. 
52 See infra Part III.A (considering the problem with causation and multiple party actions 
in regards to the characteristics of environmental torts). 
53 See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 6–7 (explaining why there is a need to consider public 
policy as applicable to general tort public policy). 
54 See id. at 7–9 (suggesting twelve tort public policies that have traditionally applied to 
tort law).  Johnson provides twelve tort public policies that are applicable to tort lawsuits.  
Id.  The public policies are:  (1) “[l]iability should be based on fault;” (2) “[l]iability should be 
proportional to fault;” (3) “[l]iability should be used to deter accidents;” (4) “[t]he costs of 
accidents should be spread broadly;” (5) “[t]he costs of accidents should be shifted to those 
best able to bear them;” (6) “[t]hose who benefit from dangerous activities should bear 
resulting losses;” (7) “[t]ort law should foster predictability in human affairs;” (8) “[t]ort law 
should facilitate economic growth and the pursuit of progress;” (9) “[t]ort law should be 
administratively convenient and efficient, and should avoid intractable inquiries;” (10) 
“[t]ort law should promote individual responsibility and discourage the waste of resources;” 
(11) “[c]ourts should accord due deference to co-equal branches of government;” and (12) 
“[a]ccident victims should be fully compensated.”  Id.  The tort public policies that are not 
included in this section and are not evaluated in this Note are as follows:  (1) “[t]he costs of 
accidents should be spread broadly;” (2) “[t]he costs of accidents should be shifted to those 
best able to bear them;” and (3) “[t]ort law should be administratively convenient and 
efficient, and should avoid intractable inquiries.”  Id.  While these are still important tort 
public policies to consider when evaluating mass environmental torts, the remaining three 
policies often interlink with the other policies and do not require their own analysis.  Id. 
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actions; (2) to benefit the general public; and (3) to promote economic 
prudence.55 
Within the first purpose, to hold one liable for their tortious actions, 
tort public policy states that “liability should be based on fault,” which is 
built upon the notion that liability should be imposed on the defendant 
only if the defendant’s conduct is blameworthy.56  The public policy 
stating that “[t]ort law should promote individual responsibility and 
discourage the waste of resources” is premised with the purpose of 
discouraging the waste of judicial resources.57  Individuals who have a 
high risk for liability are encouraged to use the resources around them to 
protect their interests and prevent harm, rather than waiting for the harm 
to occur and relying on the judicial system to provide a remedy.58  The 
final public policy that ensures individuals are held responsible for their 
tortious actions states “those who benefit from dangerous activities 
should bear [the] resulting losses” and is based on the principle of 
culpability.59 
                                                
55 See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 6–9 (discussing the general tort public policies that are 
applicable to environmental torts and the different categorical purposes the public polices 
form for environmental law). 
56 See id. at 7 (considering fault as a tort public policy and establishing the need to hold 
one responsible for the harm he or she cause another).  Tort public policy defines fault as a 
situation where harm is the product of intentional conduct or failure to exercise the 
appropriate amount of due care.  Id.  See also Fault, LAW DICTIONARY (2016), 
http://thelawdictionary.org/fault/ [https://perma.cc/8DY6-5KND] (defining fault in a 
civil lawsuit as “[a]n improper act or omission, injurious to another, and transpiring through 
negligence, rashness, or ignorance” and explaining that there are three degrees of fault in 
law). 
57 See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 9 (exploring the concept of wasting judicial resources as 
a deterrent and the promotion of sound tort public policy). 
58 See id. (advocating for conserving judicial resources and arguing how the resolution of 
the circuit split will help promote this public policy in the environmental field); see also Roger 
Bernstein, Judicial Economy and Class Actions, 7 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 349, 349–50 (1978) (providing 
the economic impact class actions have on the judicial system).  Class actions face the issue 
of aggregating small claims to one claim big enough so the potential recovery for the 
plaintiffs outweighs the cost of litigation.  Bernstein, supra note 58, at 349.  However, many 
opponents of class actions argue this wastes judicial resources because these small claims are 
claims the plaintiffs would not have brought individually because the amount they could 
recover is so insignificant compared to the cost of litigation.  Id.  Having vague legislative 
regulations applicable to issues that already have a reputation of wasting judicial resources 
further enforces that concept.  Id. 
59 See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 8 (advocating for liability of those who assume risky 
behaviors); see also Peter Clarke, Tort Law Liability, LEGALMATCH (2015), http://www.legal 
match.com/law-library/article/tort-law-liability.html [https://perma.cc/6UEL-HSUY] 
(explaining the different theories of tort liability).  Traditionally, tort law has many different 
theories of liability.  Clarke, supra note 59.  Joint liability occurs when several tortfeasors are 
held responsible for injury against one party.  Id.  The tortfeasors are jointly liable and are 
required to pay based on their individual degree of liability.  Id.  Vicarious liability usually 
occurs in the work place where someone in a superior position is responsible for the actions 
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The second purpose of the nine applicable general tort public policies 
is to promote these policies for the benefit of the public.60  The public 
policy that “[l]iability should be used to deter accidents” seeks to 
minimize, and potentially prevent, future accidents by discouraging 
certain classes of individuals from engaging in conduct that poses a risk 
of injury.61  To further benefit the public, “[t]ort law should foster 
predictability in human affairs,” indicating a person should not be forced 
to act without knowing what the law requires of them.62  Finally, 
“[a]ccident victims should be fully compensated” for the resulting harm 
they suffer ensures individuals receive compensation for any accidents 
they are not at fault for.63 
                                                
of his or her subordinates.  Id.  Liability to third parties is another theory of liability, which 
is most apparent in landlord-tenant relationships where a tortfeasor is held responsible for 
injuries sustained by a third party.  Id.  Contributory negligence, also known as 
plaintiff/victim liability, is a situation where the plaintiffs contributed to the harm that 
resulted and are liable for the part of the harm that they caused.  Id.  Strict liability holds a 
tortfeasor liable even if they had no intention to cause the resulting harm.  Clark, supra note 
59.  Clarke discusses the theory of requiring that those who knowingly participate in harmful 
or dangerous activities be held responsible for any harm that results from those dangerous 
activities.  Id. 
60 See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the three categories of tort public policy applicable to 
environmental torts). 
61 See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 7 (arguing that it is good public policy to deter accidents 
and prevent harm). 
62 See id. at 8 (providing the tort public policies); see also Cass, supra note 13, at 671 n.4 
(stating that the Latin phrase ignorantia juris non exusat translates to ignorance of the law 
excuses no one).  To uphold this legal principle, courts should provide clear guidelines for 
the parties to understand.  See infra Part IV (discussing this Note’s proposed contribution). 
63 See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 9 (exploring why “[a]ccident victims should be fully 
compensated”); see also Ken LaMance, Remedies in Tort Law, LEGALMATCH (2015), 
http://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/remedies-in-tort-law.html 
[https://perma.cc/P43D-L83B] (explaining the different forms of compensation in tort law 
available to plaintiffs).  Compensation comes in many forms in tort law.  LaMance, supra note 
63.  A victim of a tort can receive damages, which are monetary payments to compensate for 
any injuries, losses, and pain and suffering.  Id.  Punitive damages, which are damages used 
to punish and deter the negligent conduct, may be included as well.  Id.  There are also 
restitutionary remedies.  Id.  Restitutionary damages are similar to monetary damages; 
however, they are calculated based on the tortfeasor’s gain rather than the plaintiff’s loss.  Id.  
Replevin allows the plaintiff to recover property that may have been lost because of the tort.  
Id.  Ejectment removes a person staying on real property owned by the plaintiff, and is 
usually only present in trespass torts.  LaMance, supra note 63.  Courts may also put a 
property lien, which is a method of compensating a plaintiff for his or her harm through the 
sale of the tortfeasor’s property.  Id.  A third category of remedies is equitable remedies, 
which comes into play when monetary damages will not suffice as adequate compensation.  
Id.  Equitable remedies include temporary restraining orders, which prevent the tortfeasor 
from contacting or coming near the plaintiff, and temporary or permanent injunctions, which 
may prohibit the tortfeasor’s activity or may order a tortfeasor to take affirmative steps.  Id.  
Generally, for environmental torts, courts only consider compensatory and punitive 
damages.  Id. 
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The final purpose of general tort public policy is to encourage 
economic prudence.64  Environmental catastrophes and vague statutory 
definitions do not encourage economic prudence and violate the policy 
that “[t]ort law should facilitate economic growth and the pursuit of 
progress.”65  To further promote economic prudence, courts need to 
recognize certain questions are generally best left to the legislature to 
remedy in a statute, rather than relying on the judicial branch to resolve 
in litigation.66  Therefore, “[c]ourts should accord due deference to co-
equal branches of government,” ensuring that the judicial and legislative 
branches are in a balance ultimately promoting economic prudence.67 
Currently, these nine tort public policies are not adequately 
considered in the current interpretation of the CAFA and the same event 
or occurrence language.68  Tort public policy should be promoted for the 
safety and health of the citizens who could potentially be impacted by 
these environmental catastrophes.69  Thus, for the benefits of tort public 
policy and to alleviate the confusion amongst the parties and the judicial 
system, a more precise definition of same event or occurrence is needed.70 
B. The History of the Class Action Fairness Act 
Cases that involve large numbers of plaintiffs or defendants are 
known as class actions.71  Today, the function of a class action lawsuit is 
                                                
64 See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 6–7 (discussing the three categories of tort public policy 
applicable to the environmental torts and the issue of removal jurisdiction and arguing for 
the need to resolve the circuit split to promote these public policies). 
65 See id. at 9 (advocating economic growth and arguing that the promotion of economic 
growth is one form of tort public policy). 
66 See id. (encouraging the balance of the judicial and legislative branches of government). 
67 See id. (promoting co-equal branches of government and requiring that defendants take 
action to prevent their harm, rather than waste judicial resources by relying on the court to 
determine the damages). 
68 See infra Part II.B (demonstrating how the CAFA fails to adequately define the same 
event or occurrence exception). 
69 See infra Part II.C (exemplifying situations where parties were detrimentally harmed by 
environmental catastrophes). 
70 See infra Part IV (providing the factor test courts should adopt to eliminate the vague 
standard of the same event or occurrence exception under the CAFA). 
71 See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B) (2005) (explaining what 
is a class action under the CAFA); see also McCastle v. Rollins Envt’l Servs. of La., Inc., 456 
So. 2d 612, 615 (La. 1984) (holding that a class action was an appropriate form of suit that 
was brought before the Louisiana state court and exemplifying a situation of a class action 
lawsuit).  In McCastle, there were approximately 4,000 residents who lived near a hazardous 
waste disposal facility owned by Rollins Environmental Services.  McCastle, 456 So. 2d at 615  
The plaintiffs alleged that from March 6, 1980 to February 21, 1981, the land farming 
operation produced chemical fumes that caused the plaintiffs’ illnesses and discomfort with 
burning eyes, sore throats, and upset stomachs, while increasing the risk of asthma, cancer, 
and heart disease.  Id. 
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to prevent plaintiffs’ remedies from being limited simply because the rules 
of court restrict their ability to bring a claim.72  Class actions, rooted in 
English courts, were created to combat common problems in multiparty 
lawsuits.73  Taking from the equitable principles found in English law, the 
American court system sought to provide a remedy in law and equity to 
those harmed in class actions.74  Eventually, the United States adopted 
Equity Rule 38, a rewritten version of the English Equity Rule 48.75  Equity 
                                                
72 See West v. Randall, 29 F.Cas. 718, 721 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (discussing the rights of 
defendants to a claim and interested parties in a lawsuit); see also Brown v. W. & G. Ricketts, 
3 Johns.Ch. 553, 555–56 (N.Y. Ch. 1818) (discussing the issue of whether certain parties can 
be involved in the claim brought). 
73 See BRIAN ANDERSON & ANDREW TRASK, THE CLASS ACTION PLAYBOOK 3 (Samantha 
Cassetta et al. eds., 2010) (discussing generally how to litigate class actions).  Class actions 
have not always existed in American law and the legislation regarding class actions is based 
on English law.  Id.  Many problems may arise with single-plaintiff lawsuits.  Id.  First, 
separate lawsuits may lead to inconsistent outcomes.  Id.  This means a court may rule two 
different ways in cases that are factually similar.  Id.  These inconsistencies can degrade the 
view of the American judicial system as one legislative body because it raises a question of 
fairness.  Id.  Second, requiring separate lawsuits for claims that may be against the same 
defendant causes individuals to waste their economic resources.  ANDERSON & TRASK, supra 
note 73, at 3.  Litigation is expensive because, for example, it requires hiring an attorney to 
research elements of a claim, hiring appropriate experts, and reviewing documents and other 
pieces of evidence.  Id.  See also West, 29 F.Cas. at 721 (discussing the laws of equity).  When 
developing a class action, English courts considered all persons with an interest in the subject 
matter of a suit a necessary party and one that could be involved in the lawsuit.  Id. at 718.  
See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 803 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (exemplifying 
a situation of multiparty litigation). 
74 See West, 29 F.Cas. at 721 (quoting Justice Joseph Story who stated that “[i]t is a general 
rule in equity, that all persons materially interested, either as plaintiffs or defendants in the 
subject matter of the bill ought to be made parties in the suit, however numerous they may 
be.”).  Justice Story listed three exceptions in regards to the general rule that all interested 
parties to the suit should be involved.  Id. at 722.  The first exception is if there are numerous 
parties, it will be almost impossible to bring them all before the court.  Id.  The second 
exception to the rule is if the question is of general interest, a few may sue for the benefit of 
the whole.  Id.  The final exception is if the parties form part of a voluntary association, they 
may represent the rights and interests of the whole.  Id.  For those harmed, courts have 
traditionally been interested in promoting equitable relief by providing the opportunity to 
present the case.  Id. at 718; see also Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 
VAND. L. REV. 997, 998–99 (2015) (considering the laws of equity and how the courts evaluate 
equity when adjudicating issues and reaching a remedy). 
75 See Clarke v. Boysen, 285 F. 122, 126 (8th Cir. 1922) (providing the language for Equity 
Rule 48).  Equity Rule 48 states that: 
Where the parties on either side are very numerous, and cannot, without 
manifest inconvenience and oppressive delays in the suit, be all brought 
before it, the court in its discretion may dispense with making all of 
them parties, and may proceed in the suit, having sufficient parties 
before it to represent all the adverse interests of the plaintiffs and the 
defendants in the suit properly before it.  But, in such cases, the decree 
shall be without prejudice to the rights and claims of all the absent 
parties. 
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Rule 38 provided that when the issue before the court is one of common 
or general interest to many persons, so that it would be impracticable to 
bring them all before the court individually, then one or two individuals 
may sue or defend on behalf of the whole group.76  Over time, American 
courts have found if there were numerous parties, it would be 
impracticable to bring them all into court, but if these parties had a 
common interest and adequate representation in the claim filed, the courts 
had a willingness to allow cases to proceed as class actions.77 
Before the enactment of the CAFA, the courts considered many 
environmental regulations and rules when adjudicating environmental 
torts to prevent corruption that may occur with complex litigation.78  The 
                                                
Id.  See also Class Action, LEGAL INFO. INST. (2015), https://www.law.cornell. 
edu/wex/class_action [https://perma.cc/4DSD-FN3L] (evaluating how class suits apply to 
the rules of equity and providing the language for Equity Rule 48).  Equity rules are a group 
of rights and procedures set in place to provide fairness.  Equity, LAW.COM (2015), 
http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=646 [https://perma.cc/76NS-2NQD].  
The rules of equity arose in England in response to the strict rules of common law.  Id.  The 
courts of chancery, also known as the courts of equity, were established to provide remedies 
through royal power that common law did not provide.  Id.  The courts of law and the courts 
of equity were separate during that time in England; however, the two usually combined 
and were treated under the same cause of action.  Id.  See Daniel K. Hopkinson, The New 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Compared with the Former Federal Equity Rules and the Wisconsin 
Code, 23 MARQ. L. REV. 159, 170 (1939) (providing Equity Rule 38, which combined the 
previous language in Smith and Equity Rule 48 that helped form F.R.C.P. 23 surrounding 
class actions). 
76 See Hopkins, supra note 75, at 170 (discussing Equity Rule 38, which is the rule the 
United States chose to adopt based on the English Rules of Equity).  Equity Rule 38 states 
that: 
[T]he test to be applied to representative suits was that the question 
should be one of common or general interest to many persons 
constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring 
them all before the court 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
77 See FED. R. CIV. P. 20 (explaining the requirements for joining parties into one action); 
see also FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (providing the requirements for consolidating multiple claims 
into one action). 
78 See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a), (c) (1972) (governing water pollution on a 
federal level); Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (1990) (providing a way to mitigate and 
deter future oil spills in the United States); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401(b)–(c) (1963) 
(standardizing a method of controlling air pollution on a national level); National 
Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1969) (promoting the enhancement of the 
environment); see also Timeline:  The Modern Environmental Movement, PBS (2016), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/timeline/earthdays/ 
[https://perma.cc/8HGT-QUV4] (providing that throughout the 1970s, the legislature 
adopted environmental statutes and regulations to protect the environment and promote 
public safety as a public policy argument).  On January 1, 1970, the Court adopted the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, requiring federal agencies to consider the 
environmental consequences of their actions and disclose those impacts to the public to help 
deter future harms.  42 U.S.C. § 4321.  The Clean Air Amendment of 1970 sought to protect 
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federal courts adopted Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(“F.R.C.P.”) because the environmental regulations failed to assist in the 
adjudication of a class action claim.79  F.R.C.P. 23 is one of the earlier 
examples of the judicial system’s attempt to address litigation of class 
actions, and it provides four conditions that allow a claim to be considered 
a class action.80  The first condition requires the size of the class to be so 
large that joinder is not possible.81  The next requirement is that the class 
presents a common question of law and fact.82  The third requirement 
provides that the representatives in the lawsuit must present claims and 
defenses of those that are typical of that class of individuals.83  Finally, the 
                                                
public health by providing air quality standards for people to know when the air is 
considered unsafe for humans and hazardous to the environment.  33 U.S.C. § 1251.  In 1990, 
the Oil Pollution Act aspired to remedy the gaps found in the Clean Water Act of 1977 and 
the Federal Water Pollution Act of 1972.  § 2701.  The Oil Pollution Act was directed at 
companies who are at a high liability for spilling oil into the United States waterways and 
required that companies have a plan to prevent the spills and a detailed plan outlining the 
actions the company would take in the event of an oil spill.  Id.  See also Alexandra Lahav, 
Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65, 65–66 (2003) (discussing 
the procedural problems that arise with complex litigation procedure such as class actions). 
79 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (listing guidelines for a judge to determine if the prerequisites 
for a class action have been met). 
80 See id. (providing the prerequisites for a class action).  F.R.C.P. 23 further requires the 
following to have a successful class action:  there is a risk of inconsistent rulings; the interests 
of others are similar; the defendants have not behaved in a manner the class bringing the 
action expects; the claims of the class have a common question of law or fact; and that a class 
action is superior to other methods of adjudication to have a class action.  See also FED. R. CIV. 
P. 23(b) (describing the different types of class actions that may arise); see also Sarah Somers, 
7.2 Rule 23 Class Certification Requirements, SARGENT SHRIVER NAT’L CTR. ON POVERTY L. 
(2014), http://federalpracticemanual.org/node/42 [https://perma.cc/ZXV8-JDSX] 
(reviewing the requirements, under F.R.C.P 23, for class certification). 
81 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (requiring that the class be so broad and encompassing that 
it is impractical to join the members of the claim); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a) (discussing 
when parties may be joined in one action).  Joinder is a situation in which several lawsuits, 
or several parties, may be combined in one lawsuit so long as the issues and facts in the case 
are the same.  FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a). 
82 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (ensuring that the class action involves the same issue 
between all the plaintiffs); see also Stephen A. Wiener, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact 
Distinction, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1867, 1867–68 (1966) (discussing the distinction between law 
and fact).  Questions of facts are issues that are to be resolved by the jury, whereas questions 
of law are issues that are to be resolved by the judge.  Id. at 1867. 
83 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3) (suggesting that the claims and defenses the parties may bring 
are common to the claim).  Some common defenses in toxic torts are:  the plaintiff has not 
proved the elements necessary for the claim, the defendant has not caused the resulting 
harm, the defendant has complied with government regulations and should not be held 
liable, the plaintiff assumed the risk of harm, and the statute of limitations has run out.  See 
Kathleen Michon, Toxic Tort Litigation:  Common Defenses, NOLO (2015), 
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/toxic-tort-litigation-common-defenses-32209. 
html [https://perma.cc/2G7T-5SZ8] (establishing some of the common defenses of toxic 
torts that defendants may raise in litigation). 
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representatives must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class.84  However, this rule did not alleviate the problems of forum 
shopping and other mass litigation problems.85 
The law has not been without attempt to provide an adequate solution 
for proper litigation of mass environmental torts, and in response to the 
past failures, former President George W. Bush signed the CAFA into law 
on February 17, 2005.86  The CAFA’s purpose is to ensure fair and prompt 
recoveries for plaintiffs with multiple claims, restore the intent of those 
who drafted the Constitution by providing federal court jurisdiction over 
cases of national importance, and benefit society by encouraging 
innovation and lowering consumer prices.87  As such, the CAFA 
supplements F.R.C.P. 23 and provides a way for parties to remove an 
action to federal court.88 
The CAFA defines a class action as “any civil action filed under Rule 
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar state statute or rule of 
                                                
84 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (allowing the classes to act as a representative for everyone 
who is an interested class member). 
85 See Lahav, supra note 78, at 65–66 n.3 (providing a guide that discusses complex 
litigation procedure); see also Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split:  The Supreme 
Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 405, 431 (1998) (exemplifying some of 
the problems associated with circuit splits). 
86 See Lahav, supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing the numerous 
environmental regulations to help deter environmental catastrophes); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(a) (providing a piece of legislation used to aid courts in adjudicating class actions); Marcy 
Hogan Greer & Paul L. Peyronnin, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in A PRACTITIONER’S 
GUIDE TO CLASS ACTIONS 241 (Marcy Hogan Greer et al. eds., 2010) (stating the Act was 
enacted in response to abuse in class action litigation stated in the Senate Judiciary 
Committee Report).  Commenting on the purpose of the Act, the Senate Judiciary Committee 
Report stated: 
One key reason for the problems with our existing class action system is 
that most class actions are currently adjudicated in state courts, where 
the governing rules are applied inconsistently (frequently in a manner 
that contravenes basic fairness and due process considerations) and 
where there is often inadequate supervision over litigation procedures 
and proposed settlements. 
Greer & Peyronnin, supra note 86, at 241.  Those who ratified the CAFA have ultimately 
concluded that states are not able to adequately handle massive, multistate class actions.  Id. 
at 242.  Thus, Congress created a law that alleviated some of the claims states would be 
required to hear.  Id. 
87 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012) (explaining the purposes of the CAFA are to “(1) assure fair 
and prompt recoveries for class members with legitimate claims; (2) restore the intent of the 
framers of the United States Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of 
interstate cases of national importance under diversity jurisdiction; and (3) benefit society by 
encouraging innovation and lowering consumer prices”). 
88 See § 1332(d)(1)(B) (discussing class action lawsuits and defining a class action as “any 
civil action filed under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute 
or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more representative 
persons as a class action”). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 51, No. 1 [2016], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol51/iss1/6
2016] Mass Misperception 181 
judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought by [one] or more 
representative persons.”89  By comparison, under § 1332(d) of the CAFA, 
federal courts have minimal diversity jurisdiction over class actions with 
100 or more individual class members whose amount in controversy 
exceeds more than $5 million.90  The CAFA defines a mass action as “any 
civil action [where] . . . [the] claims of 100 or more persons are proposed 
to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common 
questions of law or fact.”91  As such, a mass action is deemed to be a class 
action and removable under the United States Code (“U.S.C.”) 
§§ 1332(d)(2)-(10).92  However, the CAFA provides an exception to this 
rule.93  Under the CAFA, a mass action does not exist if “all the claims in 
the action arise from an event or occurrence in the State in which the action 
was filed, and that allegedly resulted in injuries in that State or in States 
contiguous to that state.”94  While this exception is helpful for the purposes 
                                                
89 See § 1332(d)(1)(B) (defining a class action as any civil action filed under Rule 23 of the 
F.R.C.P. authorizing an action to be brought by one or more representative persons); see also 
§ 1711(2) (providing another instance in which a class action is defined); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) 
(establishing guidelines for litigating mass actions as class actions). 
90 See § 1332 (providing the sections of the United States Code where the CAFA is 
codified); see also § 1332(a) (discussing non-class action federal jurisdiction requiring that the 
parties be of diverse citizenship, meaning that the parties involved in the lawsuit must be 
citizens of different states, and requiring the amount in controversy to exceed $75,000). 
91 § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i); see also Civil Action, LAW DICTIONARY (2015), http://thelaw 
dictionary.org/civil-action/ [https://perma.cc/U2QT-VUXV] (explaining that a civil action 
is a lawsuit in civil law where there is a personal action instituted to compel payment or 
doing something else that is purely civil in nature). 
92 See § 1332(d)(11)(A) (describing a mass action generally).  Mass actions can be removed 
as class actions under the CAFA because class actions are an area of law that federal courts 
have jurisdiction over.  § 1332(d)(2). 
93 See § 1332(d)(3), § 1332(d)(4), § 1332(d)(11) (explaining exceptions of claims that come 
within the CAFA).  Under the CAFA there are additional exceptions for mass actions.  Id.  
This Note focuses on only one exception for mass actions—what constitutes the same event 
or occurrence for a mass action to be a class action—and thus, removable to federal court as 
a class action.  See supra Part II.A (considering the characteristics of environmental torts).  
However, there are additional limitations to federal court jurisdiction of mass actions under 
the CAFA.  § 1332(d)(11)(B).  The first limitation of mass actions and federal jurisdiction is 
the federal court has the discretion to choose whether to exercise jurisdiction over a mass 
action when more than one-third, but fewer than two-thirds, of the members of citizens of 
the foreign states and the primary defendants are also citizens of the forum state.  
§ 1332(d)(3).  Furthermore, a district court is required to decline jurisdiction if two-thirds or 
more of the class members and the primary defendants are citizens of the forum state.  
§ 1332(d)(4)(B).  Another instance where the district court is required to decline jurisdiction 
over a mass action is when the principal injuries resulting from the conduct at issue occurred 
in the forum state or where no similar class action involving any of the same defendants was 
filed during the three-year period before the filing of the complaint at issue.  § 1332(d)(4)(A). 
94 § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I).  Also, a mass action is not considered a class action if: 
the claims are joined upon motion of a defendant; all of the claims in the 
action are asserted on behalf of the general public (and not on behalf of 
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of removal jurisdiction, the phrase “same event or occurrence” is vague in 
the context of environmental torts.95  The vagueness of the single local 
event exception can be further exemplified by the three-way circuit split 
of the Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits.96 
C. The Circuit Split 
Circuit splits are generally disfavored because they create inconsistent 
holdings and confuse the parties and prospective litigants.97  Recently, the 
Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuit courts evaluated the issue of whether a 
mass action is a class action under the single local event exception.98  These 
three circuits provided different interpretations of what was considered 
the same event or occurrence phrase, thereby creating inconsistent 
holdings surrounding environmental torts.99 
In the Third Circuit ruling, Abraham v. St. Croix Renaissance Group, 
L.L.L.P., over 500 individual plaintiffs sued because of an aluminum 
refinery’s negligent operation, which harmed the plaintiffs’ health and 
land.100  When the defendants attempted to remove the action to federal 
court, the plaintiffs sought to remand the case back to the state court 
arguing that federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the 
                                                
individual claimants or members of a purported class) pursuant to a 
State statute specifically authorizing such action; or the claims have 
been consolidated or coordinated solely for pretrial proceedings. 
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(II)–(IV). 
95 See infra Part III.A (evaluating the CAFA and critiquing the vague language of the single 
local event exception). 
96 See infra Part III (addressing the problems with the vagueness of the same event or 
occurrence phrase); see also infra Part IV (providing a solution to the vague language of the 
CAFA’s single local event exception). 
97 See infra Part III.A (critiquing circuit splits through the lens of tort public policy); see also 
Deborah Beim & Kelly Rader, Evolution of Conflict in the Court of Appeals, YALE UNIV. (May 
12, 2015), http://campuspress.yale.edu/beim/files/2011/10/Beim_Rader_Conflicts-
xxkfk0.pdf [https://perma.cc/XRZ7-ADQB] (recognizing the reasons for circuit splits and 
evaluating how long circuit split conflicts exist before they are resolved). 
98 See infra Part II.C (discussing three recent examples of the single local event exception 
under the CAFA). 
99 See infra Part II.C (commenting on the three-way circuit split and courts’ interpretations 
of the CAFA). 
100 See 719 F.3d 270, 272–73 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that the continued release of hazardous 
materials over a period of time is a single event).  St. Croix Renaissance Group (“SCRG”) 
owned an aluminum refinery, and the plaintiffs asserted that for thirty years, as a result of 
the refinery’s operations, hazardous materials were buried in red mud and stored outdoors 
in piles up to 120 feet high and spreading over 190 acres of land.  Id. at 272–73.  Apart from 
these hazardous materials, friable asbestos was also present.  Id. at 273.  The wind dispersed 
these chemicals causing erosion.  Id.  The plaintiffs argue that SCRG knew gusts of wind 
could easily disburse the red mud and that plaintiffs and their property could be subject to 
damage because of the red mud, but did nothing to combat it.  Id. 
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mass action fell under the single local event exception.101  The court found 
that “[t]he word event . . . is not always confined to a discrete happening 
that occurs over a short time span such as a fire, explosion, hurricane[,] or 
chemical spill.”102  As such, the Third Circuit ultimately concluded that an 
environmental hazard that is continuing in nature might fit the “event” 
element of the single local event exception of the CAFA.103 
In the Ninth Circuit ruling of Allen v. The Boeing Company, the plaintiffs 
filed an action against Boeing, Landau, and fifty John Does alleging 
property damage due to groundwater contamination spanning over a 
fifty-three-year period.104  Boeing removed the action to the federal court 
on the basis that the federal courts had jurisdiction to hear the claim 
because the claim was a mass action.105  The plaintiffs then motioned to 
remand the issue back to state court, arguing the claim fell under the single 
                                                
101 See id. at 272 (stating where the claim was original filed); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) 
(providing that a defense motion must be filed under this rule when a party is trying to 
dismiss a claim for a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction).  A court must have jurisdiction to 
have authority to enforce a judgment on a claim.  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).  Subject-matter 
jurisdiction is one type of jurisdiction that allows a claim to be heard in federal court.  Id.  
Subject-matter jurisdiction is the requirement that the court has the power to hear the specific 
kind of claim brought to the court.  Id.  If courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction, they 
must dismiss the case.  Id.  Class actions are an example of claims that federal courts have 
subject-matter jurisdiction over due to their complex nature; therefore, if a mass action is not 
a class action, federal courts do not have jurisdiction over the claim.  Id. 
102 Abraham, 719 F.3d at 274 (emphasis in original).  The first step is to determine whether 
the particular language has a plain and unambiguous meaning regarding the dispute in the 
case.  Id.  If the meaning of the statutory text is plain, then there is no further inquiry.  Id. 
103 See id. (concluding that a continuing event may still be the same event).  The District 
Court noted that the word event used in the CAFA could encompass a continuing tort, for 
example, the continuous release of a toxic chemical.  Id.  The District Court reasoned that 
using a narrow view, like what SCRG wanted to argue, would undermine the intent of 
Congress to allow state courts to adjudicate claims involving truly localized torts with 
localized injuries.  Id.  To illustrate this, the District Court stated that: 
[T]he word event in our view is not always confined to a discrete 
happening that occurs over a short time span such as a fire, explosion, 
hurricane, or chemical spill. For example, one can speak of the Civil War 
as a defining event in American history, even though it took place over 
a four-year period and involved many battles. 
Abraham, 719 F.3d at 277 (emphasis in original).  The Third Circuit upheld the District Court’s 
reasoning.  Id. at 280. 
104 See 784 F.3d 625, 627 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that a single event is limited to a single 
happening).  Landau was the environmental remediation contractor for Boeing and the 
plaintiffs asserted that Landau was liable for negligently investigating, remediating, and 
cleaning up the contamination, and for failing to warn plaintiffs of the contamination.  Id. 
105 See id. at 627–28 (discussing the removal procedure); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(A) 
(2012) (providing that so long as the action is considered a mass action under the CAFA, then 
the case may be removed to federal court). 
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local event exception and the local controversy exception of the CAFA.106  
Ultimately, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated that the single event or 
occurrence exclusion only applies where “all claims arise from a single 
event or occurrence.”107 
Finally, in the Fifth Circuit, Rainbow Gun Club, Inc. v. Denbury Onshore, 
L.L.C., a group of 167 individuals brought a negligence claim against 
Denbury Onshore for injuries incurred thirteen years prior.108  Denbury 
moved to remove the action to federal court under the CAFA, and the 
plaintiffs moved to remand the motion, claiming that the single local event 
exclusion applied.109  The Fifth Circuit held that the ongoing patterns of 
conduct were contextually connected, and therefore resulted in one event, 
                                                
106 See Allen, 784 F.3d at 628–30, 633 (evaluating the motion on remand); see also Coleman 
v. Estes Express Lines, Inc., 631 F.3d 1010, 1010–17 (9th Cir. 2011) (providing the precedent 
case the Ninth Circuit relied on in Allen).  In Coleman, the court stated a plaintiff seeking 
remand under this exception has the burden of showing that the exception applies and 
indicated that issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo.  Coleman, 631 F.3d at 
1013–14.  Coleman further holds “that CAFA’s language unambiguously directs the district 
court to look only to the complaint in deciding whether the criteria set forth in 
§ 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(aa) and (bb) are satisfied.”  Id. at 1015.  The court in Coleman offered 
three reasons for courts not looking beyond the complaint to determine whether a case 
satisfies the requirements of subsections (aa) and (bb).  Id. at 1016.  The first requirement 
states that “the plain language of these subsections indicates, through the use of the words 
‘sought’ and ‘alleged,’ that the district court is to look to the complaint rather than to extrinsic 
evidence.”  Id.  The second requirement states “though district courts sometimes consider 
evidence in making some subject matter jurisdiction determinations, they do not always do 
so.”  Id.  The final requirement states “factual determinations under subsections (aa) and (bb) 
are likely to be more expensive and time consuming than factual determinations of 
citizenship and amount-in-controversy.”  Id. at 1016.  The court in Coleman concluded that 
“nothing in CAFA . . . indicates a congressional intention to turn a jurisdictional 
determination concerning the local defendant’s ‘alleged conduct’ into a mini-trial on the 
merits of the plaintiff’s claims.”  Coleman, 631 F.3d at 1017.  While this is not the section 
addressed in this Note, it provides some understanding as to how to interpret the language 
of the CAFA. 
107 See Allen, 784 F.3d. at 628–29 (emphasis omitted) (deciding on the definition of the same 
event or occurrence).  Previously, on September 23, 2014, the District Court for the Western 
District of Washington ruled that the single local event applied, and thus, the federal court 
did not have jurisdiction to hear the case.  Id. at 628. 
108 See 760 F.3d 405, 407 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that there was no single event within this 
lawsuit for the purposes of remanding the case back to state court).  The 167 individuals 
entered into a contract with Denbury Onshore, Specter Exploration, and SKH Energy 
allowing them to explore for oil, gas, and hydrocarbons on their land.  Id. at 407.  The 
plaintiffs brought a suit stating that Denbury had breached its duty as a lessee to “act as a 
reasonable and prudent operator of the well.”  Id.  They further alleged that Denbury failed 
to:  follow methods that were designed to prevent the drill pipe from getting stuck, 
adequately “cement the casing in a sidetrack well,” “heed increased differential pressures in 
the drilling of the original well,” and correct a defective cement job.  Id. 
109 See id. at 407 (describing the procedural history of the case, stating the district court 
found that the case fell under the single local event exception, and therefore, remanded the 
case back to the state court for further proceedings). 
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so the single local event exception applied.110  The three-way circuit split 
reveals that there is a need for an adequately defined standard for what is 
considered the same event or occurrence.111 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The current legal language of the CAFA does not provide a clear 
definition or explanation of the single local event exception, as evidenced 
by the three-way circuit split of the Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits.112  The 
individual circuits provided guidance on what constitutes the same event 
or occurrence in a mass environmental tort; however, federal courts 
should forego the Circuits’ previous rulings defining the same event or 
occurrence because they do not successfully consider the context of mass 
environmental torts.113  Instead, federal courts should adopt a balancing 
factor test that will allow for environmental tort claims to be evaluated 
under the same standard.114  As such, Part III.A analyzes the manners in 
which the CAFA and other environmental regulations fail to adequately 
consider removal jurisdiction of mass environmental torts.115  Next, Part 
III.B examines circuit splits and shows how they generally deter courts 
from promoting sound public policy.116 
A. The Trouble with the CAFA and Other Regulations 
Currently, under the CAFA, no unified standard or definitional 
phrase is provided for courts when they are interpreting removal 
jurisdiction of mass environmental torts.117  Originally, the CAFA and 
other mass action legislation was enacted to prevent corruption in 
multiparty litigation, but these pieces of legislation fail to accomplish that 
                                                
110 See id. at 413 (finding that the district court did not err, and instead affirmed the decision 
that the case came within the single local event exception). 
111 See supra Part II.C (exploring the holdings of the Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits 
regarding the CAFA and removal jurisdiction of mass actions). 
112 See supra Part II.B (discussing the CAFA and the definitions and standards provided 
within the legislation). 
113 See supra Part II.B (reiterating the holdings of the Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits and 
composing their standards for what the same event or occurrence is under the CAFA). 
114 See supra Part II.C (illustrating the specific facts of the cases involved circuit splits); see 
also infra Part IV (proposing a four-factor balancing test for courts to adopt). 
115 See infra Part III.A (evaluating the CAFA and arguing how it inadequately promotes the 
original purpose of the CAFA through the removal of mass actions). 
116 See infra Part III.B (analyzing circuit splits generally, and then critiquing the specific 
circuit split of the Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits). 
117 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii) (2012) (describing the single local event exception and 
discussing when a mass action is a class action to be removed to federal court under the 
CAFA). 
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purpose.118  A vague standard for removal jurisdiction, under the CAFA, 
aggravates many policy areas of tort law by failing to use liability as a 
means to deter accidents.119 
Additionally, forum shopping is another consequence that results 
from vague legislation, like the CAFA, because it encourages parties to 
remove a lawsuit from state court to federal court seeking more favorable 
treatment.120  In mass environmental tort litigation, a party may seek to 
remove a case to or from federal court simply because that forum could 
provide the party with a more favorable outcome.121  However, in reality, 
that forum may have no legal authority to adjudicate the case in the first 
place.122  Forum shopping violates tort public policy and the legislative 
intent of the CAFA.123  As such, adopting specific guidelines at the federal 
                                                
118 See Herald, supra note 85, at 431 (describing the problems associated with circuit splits, 
specifically considering the Ninth Circuit); see also ANDERSON & TRASK, supra note 73, at 3 
(exploring the different types of corruption that can occur in complex litigation, such as 
forum shopping, inconsistent judgments, issues of equity and fairness, and the waste of 
economic resources); supra Part II.C (providing the facts used to create the three-way circuit 
split of the Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuit); infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the problems that 
result from circuit splits and how they can impact the litigation of a claim). 
119 See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 7–9 (discussing the twelve general tort public policies 
that should be promoted when litigating environmental torts). 
120 See Bassett, supra note 40, at 335. 
(examining forum shopping as a problem involved in complex litigation); see also Judicial 
Selection:  The Process of Choosing Judges, ABA 5, 8 (June 2008), https://www.american 
bar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/JusticeCenter/Justice/PublicDocuments/judicial_sel
ection_roadmap.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/ULQ9-HU4K] [hereinafter Judicial 
Selection] (exploring the election of state judges and their duties to the public).  There has 
been much debate that one of the reasons parties forum shop is to avoid the potential bias of 
state judges because they are elected for limited terms and to serve the public.  Judicial 
Selection, supra note 120, at 5.  Many believe state judges should not enter rulings based on 
the interest of the public, but instead should rule in the interest of the law.  Id. at 8.  
Furthermore, incentives are provided to a plaintiff who settles because F.R.C.P. 68(d) 
requires that a plaintiff who refuses to settle must pay the defendant’s post-offer costs if the 
final judgment is less than the unaccepted offer.  F.R.C.P. 68(d).  In regards to the payment 
to the plaintiff for the resulting harm, post-judgment interest rates are monitored by federal 
law and are often significantly less than state post-judgment interest rates.  18 U.S.C. § 3612 
(2012).  There are other reasons why a defendant favors federal court over state court; 
however, these were the ones that are most apparent.  Id. 
121 See Bassett, supra note 40, at 342 (exploring the concept of forum shopping and the 
corruption associated with forum shopping because it is easier for parties to seek to file in 
the court that they know may give them a more favorable ruling). 
122 Id. at 344 (exemplifying that there is the possibility of being able to legally bring a claim 
in two forums).  While there is legal authority to bring a claim under jurisdiction and venue 
requirements outlined in the F.R.C.P., this Note focuses more on selecting one forum over 
another, specifically based on how a judge may litigate a case, making it more burdensome 
on the defendant who does not get to select the forum.  Id. at 346. 
123 See Greer & Peyronnin, supra note 86, at 241–42 (explaining the purpose of the CAFA 
and describing the inconsistent adjudication process without the CAFA); see also JOHNSON, 
supra note 50, at 7–9 (discussing tort public policy); supra Part II.A.2 (evaluating the specific 
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court level will eliminate forum shopping because parties will not be able 
to skew the facts or the evidence of their case to seek a favorable ruling 
that aligns with that specific court’s approach.124  Instead, federal courts 
should apply a unified standard to all environmental toxic tort claims for 
what constitutes the same event or occurrence under the single local event 
exception.125  Using the unified standard, courts will be able to determine 
whether a claim is properly removable to federal court.126 
Furthermore, under the current language of the CAFA, the failure to 
provide a standard for the same event or occurrence violates the drafters’ 
legislative intent, as well as tort public policy.127  Congress enacted 
numerous environmental regulations to protect the people and the 
environment.128  Therefore, to promote the legislative intent of the 
environmental policies enacted, defendants who fail to abide by the 
regulations and fail to prevent any resulting harm must be held liable.129  
The implementation of different environmental regulations are aimed at 
                                                
tort public policies that are applicable to mass environmental torts).  The CAFA sought to 
combat the problems often associated with complex litigation, and vague standards do not 
remedy the apparent problems of forum shopping and public policy violations.  Supra Part 
II.A. 
124 See Juenger, supra note 40, at 553–54 n.9 (illustrating how forum shopping works in 
favor of litigants); see also infra Part IV (providing a solution aimed at eliminating corruption 
within the judicial system). 
125 See Cummins & Aft, supra note 23, at 60 (discussing how circuit splits work and their 
impact on the Supreme Court). 
126 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I) (2012) (stating that a mass action is considered a class 
action under the CAFA when the claim does not arise out of the same event or occurrence, 
thus giving federal courts jurisdiction over the mass action as if it were a class action). 
127 See Benko v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 789 F.3d 1111, 1115–16 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(exemplifying a case that considers the local controversy exception, which is an exception 
applied to a class action).  The single local event exception differs from the local controversy 
exception because the single local event exception is a narrowly tailored rule.  Id. at 1115. 
128 See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a), (c) (1972) (advocating for the minimization of 
water pollution on a national scale); Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (1990) (construing a 
document to be used to help deter oil spills and more effectively clean up oil spills that 
occur); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1969) (recommending 
regulations to promote a clean environment); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401(b)–(c) (1963) 
(urging the regulation of air pollutants).  These environmental regulations were enacted 
before the CAFA to aid in combating the problems associated with the environment and to 
ensure that parties who fail to abide by states’ regulatory requirements are held responsible 
for their actions.  See supra Part II.B (discussing the circuit courts’ holdings regarding the 
same event or occurrence phrase). 
129 See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 7–8 (saying that those who choose to engage in risky 
behavior should bear the resulting losses and incur liability in proportion to their actions). 
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discouraging certain classes of people from engaging in forms of conduct 
that pose an excessive risk of personal injury or property damage.130 
In addition, vague legislation distracts the judge from issues such as 
liability of the defendant and recovery of the plaintiff, and shifts the focus 
to procedural issues, which is unfavorable for public policy.131  When a 
defendant chooses to forego statutory regulations, such as environmental 
regulations, a negligence action is brought and the court analyzes the 
defendant’s conduct under two different theories of negligence:  a 
negligence per se action or a breach of duty under the traditional 
negligence theory.132  The theory of negligence and element causation in a 
mass environmental tort case are the important issues that courts must 
address; however, because of the vague language of the CAFA, the courts 
instead must address issues of removal jurisdiction of mass 
environmental torts.133  A unified standard to apply to removal 
jurisdiction under the CAFA will allow the court to focus on the issue of 
the defendant’s intent and care, which will better hold tortfeasors liable 
for the resulting harm that could have been prevented or minimized.134 
Finally, the CAFA also fails to account for the fact specific nature of 
toxic tort claims.135  Due to the specific nature of such claims, it is more 
challenging for the court to consistently apply a rule that is too narrow or 
                                                
130 See id. at 6–7 (exploring tort public policy and providing that one public policy is to 
deter accidents and prevent individuals from engaging in conduct that is at a high risk of 
negligence). 
131 See id. at 7–10 (noting the importance of public policy).  Vague legislation does not 
promote public policy because it hinders and delays the plaintiff’s potential recovery.  Id. at 
9–10. 
132 See Negligence Per Se in a Personal Injury Case, ALLLAW (2015), http://www.alllaw.com/ 
articles/nolo/personal-injury/negligence-per-se.html [https://perma.cc/7ZLM-LMMN] 
(explaining that a personal injury lawsuit, such as a toxic tort lawsuit, may be brought under 
a cause of action claim or a regular personal injury litigation claim).  Environmental laws are 
designed to protect the public.  Id.  See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a), (c) (standardizing water 
pollution on a national scale); 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (suggesting a way to remedy oil spills and 
prevent future oil spills from occurring); 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (encouraging the promotion of a 
safe and clean environment); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401(b)–(c) (controlling the amount of air 
pollutants on a national scale). 
133 See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 7–9 (exploring the traditional rules for proving factual 
causation); see also Clarke, supra note 59 (reviewing the different theories of liability found 
within tort law). 
134 See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 7–9 (arguing that a tortfeasor should be liable for any 
resulting harm that he or she caused and providing the twelve tort public policies that are 
applied to the general category of tort law). 
135 See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 554 (2014) 
(describing one of the few times federal courts have ruled on the issue of removal jurisdiction 
of a mass action under the CAFA); see also Lin, supra note 34, at 1441–42, 1445–46 (stating that 
the two common hurdles for plaintiffs in toxic tort litigation are the latency period where the 
plaintiff proves that an actual harm has occurred and proving the defendant actually caused 
the harm). 
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too broad, such as the Ninth Circuit ruling and the Third Circuit ruling.136  
As such, a factor test is the most appropriate; it allows the courts to have 
discretion when hearing these cases, which is important because 
environmental laws are more fact specific when they are being litigated.137  
A unified standard is needed, because it allows for an equitable solution 
while considering the fact specific nature of environmental torts.138  The 
presence of a circuit split regarding what constitutes the same event or 
occurrence under the CAFA is not surprising.139  Courts want to ensure 
that the rule they are applying is fair and equitable for the cause, which is 
why the legislature enacted the CAFA; however, the vague language in 
the Act does little to promote fair and equitable adjudication of toxic tort 
litigation and removal jurisdiction.140  Therefore, courts need to adopt a 
unified standard to ensure that the environmental torts do actually arise 
out of the same event or occurrence, promoting the legislative intent of the 
CAFA and allowing courts to contextually analyze truly localized 
claims.141 
B. The Trouble with Circuit Splits and Toxic Torts 
Circuit splits have created many problems and have never been 
favored among courts, judges, or litigants because such splits create 
                                                
136 See Allen v. Boeing Co., 784 F.3d 625, 633 (9th Cir. 2015) (narrowing the Third Circuit’s 
view of the CAFA exception); Rainbow Gun Club, Inc. v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C., 760 F.3d 
405, 407 (5th Cir. 2014) (clarifying the Third and Ninth Circuits’ interpretation of the CAFA); 
Abraham v. St. Croix Renaissance Grp., L.L.L.P., 719 F.3d 270, 272 (3d Cir. 2013) (interpreting 
the exception under the CAFA broadly); Veron, supra note 44, at 647–48 (reviewing how toxic 
tort litigation and its fact specific nature has changed over time since the Daubert case).  The 
latter three cases exemplify the apparent need to better define the same event or occurrence 
to resolve the circuit split.  See, e.g., Allen, 784 F.3d at 633 (limiting the interpretation of the 
CAFA exception made by the Abraham Court); Rainbow Gun Club, Inc., L.L.C., 760 F.3d at 407 
(resolving the mixed interpretations of the CAFA provided by the Third and Ninth Circuits); 
Abraham, 719 F.3d at 272 (taking a broad approach to the CAFA exception). 
137 See Rice, supra note 38, at 885, 887–89 (arguing that because of the fact specific nature of 
toxic torts, the fictitious defendant problem arises); see also Franklin, supra note 33 (showing 
how environmental catastrophes can be fact specific and determining the resulting harm is 
based on the facts). 
138 See supra Part II.A (exemplifying generally the characteristics of the environmental 
torts); see also Note, supra note 32, at 2269 (stating the problems of causation and the duty of 
the plaintiff in alleging the resulting harm). 
139 See supra Part II.C (addressing the three cases that caused a three-way circuit split).  The 
Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits all provide valid arguments for what constitutes the same 
event or occurrence, but the unclear approach and the split among the Circuits is what makes 
litigation challenging.  See supra Part III.B.2 (critiquing the Circuits for their different 
interpretations of the same phrase). 
140 See Clarke v. Boysen, 285 F. 122, 126 (8th Cir. 1922) (considering Equity Rule 48 for the 
purposes of ensuring multiparty litigants are treated fairly). 
141 See Rainbow Gun Club, Inc., L.L.C., 760 F.3d at 407 (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s holding).  
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confusion and inconsistent rulings.142  In adjudicating the issue of removal 
jurisdiction for mass actions under the CAFA, the Third, Ninth, and Fifth 
Circuits attempted to balance the CAFA’s legislative intent and tort public 
policy.143  However, these circuits failed to agree on one approach that 
embodied those two concepts, thereby creating a confusing interpretation 
of the CAFA and inconsistent results.144  Therefore, a well-defined 
standard used to evaluate removal jurisdiction of mass actions is needed 
to eliminate confusion and balance the legislative intent of the CAFA 
against tort public policy.145  First, Part III.B.1 considers circuit splits 
generally and how they impact tort public policy.146  Second, Part III.B.2 
critiques the “Goldilocks Standard” of the Third, Ninth, and Fifth 
Circuits.147 
1. Circuit Splits Generally 
In toxic tort litigation, circuit splits create confusion among 
individuals seeking to bring a claim, which results in a myriad of other 
potential problems.148  Specifically, circuit splits fail to provide a consistent 
standard for judges to utilize, and the splits do not promote tort public 
policy.149  Tort principles must provide tortfeasors with a clear, consistent, 
and established standard as to when the defendant’s conduct arises from 
the same event or occurrence.150  Circuit splits challenge and complicate 
                                                
142 See supra Part III.A (evaluating the characteristics of circuit splits and analyzing the 
impact circuit splits have on environmental torts). 
143 See Abraham v. St. Croix Renaissance Grp., L.L.L.P., 719 F.3d 270, 276 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(reasoning that the phrase same event or occurrence is ambiguous; therefore, the court is able 
to look at the legislative history of the CAFA or other external material); see also Allen v. 
Boeing Co., 784 F.3d 625, 629 (9th Cir. 2015) (referring to the Senate report on the CAFA and 
interpreting the report to support the idea that the legislative history of the CAFA supports 
an interpretation of the single local event exception applying to only truly local events); 
Rainbow Gun Club, Inc., 760 F.3d at 410 (suggesting that the legislative history of the CAFA 
supports the ordinary meaning of the phrase same event or occurrence). 
144 See Complex Litigation Resource Guide, supra note 40 (stating the problems of confusion 
and extortion with circuit splits and forum shopping). 
145 See id. (explaining the problems common with circuit splits, such as confusion, 
extortion, and forum shopping). 
146 See infra Part III.B.1 (considering circuit splits and their detrimental impact generally). 
147 See infra Part III.B.2 (critiquing the specific circuit split of the Third, Ninth, and Fifth 
Circuits). 
148 See infra Part III.B.1 (explaining how forum shopping violates the legislative intent of 
the CAFA); see also Juenger, supra note 40, at 553–57 (exploring the concept of forum 
shopping). 
149 See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 7–9 (listing the different tort public policies that are 
applicable to general torts and evaluating how those general policies are applicable to 
environmental law). 
150 See id. at 8–9 (providing that tort public policy should foster predictability in human 
affairs).  Along these lines, tort public policy suggests that parties should be made aware of 
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this notion.151  The Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits each tried to resolve 
the problem when each circuit created its own test; however, their 
individual rulings contributed to the confusion by providing different 
interpretations of what constitutes the same event or occurrence for the 
purposes of removal.152 
A clear, established standard for judges to evaluate when considering 
the same event or occurrence under the CAFA would benefit the courts of 
different jurisdictions by providing one coherent standard to apply when 
adjudicating issues involving removal jurisdiction for mass 
environmental torts.153  Adopting a test to determine same event or 
occurrence would diminish the inconsistency across the Circuits, which 
would promote the interest in balancing the judicial and legislative 
branch.154  A clear standard would also help reduce the amount of time 
courts currently spend trying to evaluate the vague application provided 
by the Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits.155 
When courts reach a decision in a timely fashion, plaintiffs are able to 
get compensation quicker.156  A unified standard dealing with the issue of 
removal jurisdiction for mass torts under the CAFA will allow full and 
                                                
their dangerous actions and how those actions impact their surroundings.  Id.  Therefore, to 
account for this, any laws made to restrict the behavior of an individual for the purposes of 
public safety and public good should be clarified so the defendant can adapt his or her 
conduct accordingly.  Id. 
151 See Abraham v. St. Croix Renaissance Grp., L.L.L.P., 719 F.3d 270, 272 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(recommending a broader interpretation of the single local event exception under the 
CAFA); see also Allen v. Boeing Co., 784 F.3d 625, 633 (9th Cir. 2015) (giving a more narrow 
interpretation of the same event or occurrence under the CAFA); Rainbow Gun Club, Inc. v. 
Denbury Onshore, L.L.C., 760 F.3d 405, 407 (5th Cir. 2014) (exploring a more defined 
interpretation of the holding in Abraham); see infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing the three-way circuit 
split of the Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuit, considering the impact that circuit split has on 
tort public policy, and advocating for a unified standard to promote good tort public policy). 
152 See ANDERSON & TRASK, supra note 73, at 3 (exploring how to litigate class actions and 
explaining that because class actions are a form of complex litigation, many problems may 
arise, such as inconsistent outcomes that can cause confusion amongst the litigants). 
153 See Latham et al., supra note 48, at 740–45 (discussing the gap between the regulations 
used to handle environmental claims and the theories of common tort law).  The gap between 
different laws and regulations, as it relates to environmental claims, is a main cause of the 
circuit split because judges look at similar facts under different lenses of interpretation.  Id. 
154 See Newman, supra note 48, at 512–13 (considering that courts have battled ambiguous 
language in legislation, which raised new legal issues to be resolved, requiring judges to 
balance both public policy and the different branches of government).  
155 See Coleman v. Estes Express Lines, Inc., 631 F.3d 1010, 1020 (9th Cir. 2011) (viewing 
removal jurisdiction under the CAFA); see also supra Part II.C (exemplifying situations where 
the federal courts have to evaluate the issue of the “same event or occurrence” exception to 
removal jurisdiction of mass environmental torts under the CAFA). 
156 See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 9 (providing the tort public policy that aligns with the 
view to fully compensate accident victims and advocating for a remedy to the circuit split so 
that accident victims may receive their compensation more quickly). 
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adequate compensation for accident victims by enabling a court to arrive 
at a decision swiftly, thereby compensating the accident victim(s) faster.157  
A balanced factor test would ensure that the defendant is liable for the 
environmental catastrophe he or she caused.158 
In addition, the confusion regarding the circuit split does not promote 
economic growth.159  The complex nature of environmental torts creates 
confusion for the parties involved when trying to determine if, when, and 
how to litigate the action because the parties and attorneys cannot 
adequately infer how a judge may rule on the case.160  Without a standard 
to aid a judge in determining when to remand a case from federal court to 
state court under the single local event exception, parties to a lawsuit do 
not have the opportunity to weigh the risks and benefits of bringing a 
lawsuit, as well as the potential cost of litigation.161  Circuit splits result in 
unpredictable outcomes, so the parties tend to be less likely to settle and 
will be more willing to embrace the financial burdens of a lengthy 
lawsuit.162  By adopting a unified standard, the parties can weigh the 
potential outcome of whether their cause has the grounds to be heard in 
federal court or if it will be remanded back to the state court.163  A unified 
standard not only diminishes the costs of litigating this specific issue, but 
                                                
157 See Clarke, supra note 59 (providing the theories of tort liability, such as joint liability, 
vicarious liability, and contributory negligence, with each determining how a tortfeasor 
divides the amount of money owed to the plaintiff for the injuries incurred as a result of his 
or her negligence); see also supra Part II.A.2 (explaining one of the basic tort policies that 
accident victims should be fully compensated); compare supra Part III.B.2 (stating the holdings 
of the three-way circuit split), with infra Part IV.A (providing the four-factor contribution to 
help facilitate the adjudication of the removal issue). 
158 See infra Part IV (outlining the four-factor test that allows judges to apply a unified 
standard while still being allowed to exercise their discretion with the complex nature of 
class actions and urging courts to adopt the test to promote good tort public policy). 
159 See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 9 (arguing the two views of tort public policy favors 
economic growth and that tort public policy promotes due deference and discussing why 
economic growth is a tort public policy that courts seek to promote). 
160 See Michael Duvall, Resolving Intra-Circuit Splits in the Federal Courts of Appeal, 3 FED. 
CTS. L. REV. 17, 18–19, 21–23 (2009) (examining solutions to resolve circuit splits at the federal 
court of appeals level). 
161 See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 9 (articulating the tort public policies that surround the 
costs of litigation); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (discussing how actions before the court that 
involve a common question of law or fact may be joined to avoid any unnecessary costs or 
delays).  F.R.C.P. 23 is based on the desire to reduce costs of the parties seeking to bring a 
claim.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).  When mass actions have a common question of law or fact, they 
too can be consolidated.  Id.  From this general rule, there is an inference that courts do not 
favor costly litigation.  Id.  The vague standard of the CAFA requires that the parties spend 
more money because of litigation, which goes against the purpose of the courts.  Id. 
162 See id. (suggesting how courts prefer to save on litigation costs). 
163 See infra Part IV (providing a four-factor test that should be implemented by the federal 
courts as a unified standard to resolve the issue of removal jurisdiction for mass actions 
under the CAFA). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 51, No. 1 [2016], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol51/iss1/6
2016] Mass Misperception 193 
it promotes settlements because one party may seek to settle the matter 
outside of court if their claim cannot be heard in the court that is more 
favorable to them.164 
Defendants should be liable in a situation where the harm could have 
been prevented.165  When adjudicating claims based upon a negligence 
standard, courts have always considered the defendant’s intent and 
care.166  Negligence is usually the cornerstone of most toxic tort lawsuits; 
however, there are many interrelated negligence theories that also arise in 
toxic torts.167  Adopting a clearer standard of the same event or occurrence 
will ensure that federal courts will hear the issues of intent and care that 
they are supposed to without encroaching on the state’s rights.168  Thus, 
to alleviate the confusion among parties and the judicial system, and for 
the benefit of tort public policy, an all-inclusive standard for removal 
jurisdiction needs to be adopted by the federal courts.169 
A distinct application of the same event or occurrence will help 
facilitate growth and progress because judges will be able to give stricter 
                                                
164 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (suggesting that claims that have similar contexts may be joined 
to avoid unnecessary costs or delays); see also Bernstein, supra note 58, at 349–52 (arguing 
how class actions impact the judicial system economically). 
165 See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 8 (stating that one of the general tort public policies that 
should be promoted is the idea that those who bear the risk should also bear the burden of 
the resulting harm that occurs because of the risk that was taken). 
166 See id. at 7 (requiring that a defendant be held liable for the resulting harm if the 
defendant is at fault). 
167 See Peter K. Wahl & Rita A. Sheffey, Theories of Liability and Damages in Toxic Tort Cases, 
in TOXIC TORT LITIGATION 17–18 (D. Alan Rudlin ed., 2007) (looking at the theories of 
negligence found in toxic torts).  There are many theories of negligence that arise in toxic 
torts.  Id.  To have a successful negligence lawsuit, the plaintiff must show:  (1) a duty or 
obligation of the defendant required by law; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection 
between the breach of the duty and the resulting harm; and (4) the resulting harm, also 
known as damages.  Id. at 18.  The causal connection element, considering both actual and 
proximate cause, is the most challenging element for toxic tort litigants to prove.  Supra Part 
III.A.  However, there are other types of negligence actions such as negligence per se, gross 
negligence, and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.  Wahl & Sheffey, supra note 167, at 18.  In 
toxic tort cases, there are five specific types of negligence actions that directly correlate to 
toxic torts:  negligent failure to warn, negligent failure to investigate, negligent design, 
breach of statutory and/or regulatory duties, and breach of self-imposed duties.  Id. at 19–
23. 
168 See 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2012) (providing the purpose of the CAFA); see also infra Part III.B 
(considering the history and language of the CAFA and looking at why it was enacted, 
concluding that the framers of the CAFA had the desire to balance the interest of both the 
state and federal courts and not give one court too much power over the other when 
litigating mass actions). 
169 See supra Part III.A (discussing generally how the three-way circuit split of the Third, 
Ninth, and Fifth Circuit does not benefit tort public policy because characteristically, circuit 
splits do not promote public policy and advocating for the adoption of a unified standard to 
help promote sound tort public policy). 
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rulings based on those standards, which will help advance the hazardous 
materials industry to find better and more secure ways to prevent spills.170  
Environmental catastrophes cost large sums of money to clean and repair 
the damage.171  Individuals who have a high risk for liability should use 
the resources around them to help protect their interests and prevent the 
potential harm, instead of waiting for the harm to occur and relying on the 
judicial system to provide a remedy.172  The courts should adopt a 
standard for the purpose of eliminating confusion and promoting 
economic growth.173  The problem with circuit splits is exacerbated, as 
exemplified by the circuit split between the Third, Ninth, and Fifth 
Circuits.174 
2. The “Goldilocks Standard” of the Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits 
In general, the Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits’ application of the same 
event or occurrence exception are either too broad or too narrow.175  In 
addition to being inconsistent, the interpretations fail to provide courts 
with accurate guidelines to balance their authority to exercise discretion 
with the defendant’s due process rights of removal.176  When the Third, 
Ninth, and Fifth Circuits individually determined what is considered the 
same event or occurrence in a mass environmental tort for removal to 
                                                
170 See supra Part III (evaluating how circuit splits in general do not promote sound tort 
public policy and a unified standard should be enacted to promote tort public policy, how 
the intent of the CAFA is not being promoted through the circuit split, and how the phrase 
same event or occurrence should not be based on a view that is too broad or too narrow, but 
one that generally aligns with the Fifth Circuit). 
171 See Gilbert & Kent, supra note 4 (exemplifying the costs associated with environmental 
catastrophes such as oil spills); see also Neuhauser, supra note 1 (using the oil spill in the Gulf 
of Mexico to exemplify how it is possible the funds will not adequately compensate the 
victims, such as private business owners, of the oil spill). 
172 See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 6–9 (providing the nine tort public policies applicable to 
mass actions and environmental torts, and separating them into three general purposes that 
courts seek to promote when adjudicating cases). 
173 See infra Part IV (suggesting four factors that courts should adopt to determine the issue 
of whether a mass action is a class action under the same event or occurrence exception for 
the purposes of removal jurisdiction of mass actions under the CAFA). 
174 See Abraham v. St. Croix Renaissance Grp., L.L.L.P., 719 F.3d 270, 272–73 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(stating that the St. Croix Renaissance Group owned an aluminum refinery that released red 
mud into the air for a period of thirty years); see also Allen v. Boeing Co., 784 F.3d 625, 627, 
630, 632 (9th Cir. 2015) (asserting that the defendant was negligent by failing to warn the 
plaintiffs of the potential groundwater contamination); Rainbow Gun Club, Inc. v. Denbury 
Onshore, L.L.C., 760 F.3d 405, 407 (5th Cir. 2014) (alleging that the defendant, Denbury, 
negligently operated a drilling pipe and well). 
175 See infra Part III.B.2 (critiquing the three-way circuit split of the Third, Fifth, and Ninth 
Circuits). 
176 See Tarlock, supra note 27, at 222 (considering how courts interpret environmental 
legislation and the challenges they have with evaluating and applying the legal standards). 
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federal court, they returned three different holdings.177  Each holding has 
successful merits in defining the same event or occurrence; however, the 
holdings do not coordinate to create one concise, cohesive rule that federal 
courts may apply.178  While judges must consider the legislative intent of 
the CAFA when applying the statute, the courts have difficulty 
consistently determining what the legislative intent is.179  When 
examining the legislative intent of the CAFA, the drafters did not want an 
approach for removal jurisdiction of mass actions to be too broad or too 
narrow.180  The “Goldilocks Standard” of the same event or occurrence 
exception harmonizes one single event, which is too narrow, a continuing 
set of circumstances, which is too broad, and a continuing set of 
circumstances that are contextually connected, which is just right.181  First, 
Part III.B.2.a critiques the Third Circuit’s broad holding in Abraham.182  
Second, Part III.B.2.b analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of 
the phrase same event or occurrence as not being successful in the context 
of mass environmental torts in Allen.183  Finally, Part III.B.2.c evaluates the 
                                                
177 See Allen, 784 F.3d at 631 (limiting the single event exception to one single happening 
or one single event); Abraham, 719 F.3d at 274 (arguing “[t]he word event . . . is not always 
confined to a discrete happening that occurs over a short time span such as a fire, explosion, 
hurricane[,] or chemical spill” and ultimately concluding that an environmental hazard that 
has a continuing nature, may fit the “event” element of the local single event exception of 
the CAFA) (emphasis in original); see also Rainbow Gun Club, Inc., 760 F.3d at 413 (holding 
that because Denbury’s acts were ongoing patterns of conduct that were contextually 
connected, the continuous harm that the plaintiffs suffered all occurred in one event). 
178 See infra Part III.A (describing the critiques of the circuit splits). 
179 See United States v. Diallo, 575 F.3d 252, 256–57 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating that when looking 
to determine the scope of a statute, one must look to the ordinary meaning in the language 
of the statute); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (holding that the judicial 
department has a duty and the authority to determine what the law is). 
180 See supra Part II.B (analyzing the CAFA by looking at the English Courts of Equity’s 
previous attempts at combating corruption in environmental torts through regulations, and 
ultimately discussing how the CAFA was ratified in 2005). 
181 See Abraham, 719 F.3d at 277 (broadening the language of the CAFA single local event 
exception to encompass a continuing set of circumstances); see also Allen, 784 F.3d at 631 
(narrowing the single event or occurrence language to only one single happening); Rainbow 
Gun Club, Inc., 760 F.3d at 413 (providing the most acceptable interpretation of the CAFA by 
holding that the same event or occurrence may be a continuing set of circumstances so long 
as they are contextually connected). 
182 See infra Part III.B.2.a (exploring the problem of a broad interpretation stating that it 
further allows for corruption and does not provide a valid solution to the circuit split). 
183 See infra Part III.B.2.b (reasoning that a narrow view of the single local event exception 
does not allow for the consideration of the unique characteristics of mass environmental 
torts). 
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Fifth Circuit’s holding in Denbury as the most successful interpretation of 
the single local event exception.184 
a. Too Hot:  The Broad Holding of the Third Circuit 
The Third Circuit, while making valid claims, provides an approach 
that is too broad of a spectrum for the federal courts to apply.185  Under 
the Third Circuit’s holding, the same event or occurrence can be multiple 
events.186  The overly expansive view of the Third Circuit allows courts to 
exercise their discretion, but fails to provide guidelines or limits that allow 
courts to properly exercise that discretion.187  The proponents of the Third 
Circuit’s ruling argue that this Circuit is the most accurate in applying the 
same event or occurrence definition because the Court was merely 
interpreting the words as the law allows them, but flounders in the 
accurate interpretation of the phrase by providing a view that is too broad 
to adequately litigate the issue.188 
In spite of the fact that a single tort is not always limited to one single 
event and may in fact be multiple happenings, the Court in United States 
v. Diallo held that when there is no statutory definition for the courts to 
interpret, judges are confined to apply the ordinary meaning of the 
word.189  As such, a broad approach goes directly against the legislative 
intent of the CAFA because the CAFA sets out multiple exceptions and a 
broad interpretation of the same event or occurrence diminishes the value 
of those exceptions.190  When a broad definition is applied, courts construe 
cases and facts that may not fit within the exception, yet apply them as if 
they do.191 
Furthermore, a definition of same event or occurrence that is too 
broad may result in joining defendants that may not have actually caused 
                                                
184 See infra Part III.B.2.c (stating the reasons why the Fifth Circuit has the best 
interpretation of the phrase same event or occurrence under the CAFA and explaining how 
it will be used for the contribution). 
185 See Abraham, 719 F.3d at 277 (concluding that an event may be continuing in nature). 
186 See id. (providing the holding of the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the single local 
event exception). 
187 See Latham et al., supra note 48, at 740–45 (considering how judges evaluate tort 
common law and the legislative developments to more adequately compensate 
environmental tort victims). 
188 See Abraham, 719 F.3d at 277 (noting one of the cases involved in the three-way circuit 
split). 
189 See United States v. Diallo, 575 F.3d 252, 256–57 (3d Cir. 2009) (exemplifying the duty of 
the courts to interpret legislation). 
190 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(11)(B)(ii) (2012) (providing the multiple exceptions that are 
found within the CAFA). 
191 See id. (discussing the exceptions that are found within the CAFA). 
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the harm.192  The purpose of bringing an action against numerous 
defendants is to ensure that the defendants to a mass lawsuit are not taken 
advantage of and to guarantee that all of the plaintiffs are equally 
compensated.193  Thus, their claims and relief sought must all be similar.194  
The proposed standard seeks to ensure that the defendants of mass 
lawsuits are not taken advantage of, while guaranteeing that the plaintiffs 
are equally compensated by requiring all of the claims and relief sought 
to be similar—particularly, having the sameness in all essential details of 
a claim.195  This aspect of the test allows for the promotion of economic 
growth by ensuring that the parties are adequately compensated, are 
aware of how their claim may fare under the judge’s ruling, and are all 
interested parties in the lawsuit.196 
b. Too Cold:  The Restrictive View of the Ninth Circuit 
The view of the Ninth Circuit succeeds at ensuring that the claims of 
the mass action that arise out of the same event or occurrence are 
remanded down to the state courts; however, the view is too narrow to 
limit the standard to only one distinct act.197  Nevertheless, the Ninth 
Circuit held that these views relate to the legislative intent of the drafters 
of the CAFA, arguing that the application of the ordinary meaning was 
intended when interpreting a definition.198 
The Ninth Circuit further argued that the legislative intent of the 
single local event exception is a narrowly construed standard because 
states have an interest in adjudicating issues where the source and harm 
arise in the same place.199  However, a narrow view also undermines the 
legislative intent because it weakens the extent of Congress to allow state 
                                                
192 See Complex Litigation Resource Guide, supra note 40 (examining the problems associated 
with parties involved in multiparty claims). 
193 See Rice, supra note 38, at 885, 887–89 (addressing the problems associated with the 
fictitious defendant). 
194 See Ellis, supra note 31, at 7 (explaining how mass environmental torts involve large 
numbers of plaintiffs or defendants). 
195 See Similar, LAW DICTIONARY (2015), http://thelawdictionary.org/similar/ 
[https://perma.cc/G3BW-M73E] (defining “similar” as a “word [that] is often used to 
de[n]ote a partial resemblance only; but it is also often used to denote sameness in all 
essential particulars.  Thus, a statutory provision in relation to ‘previous conviction of a 
similar offense’ may mean conviction of an offense identical in kind”). 
196 See infra Part IV (considering the SORT Test to resolve some of the problems with the 
circuit splits). 
197 See Allen v. Boeing Co., 784 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2015) (reasoning that actions are 
considered the same event if it is a single happening). 
198 See Abraham v. St. Croix Renaissance Grp., L.L.L.P., 719 F.3d 270, 277 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(reiterating the legislative intent of the CAFA). 
199 See id. at 274 (showing that the purpose is to ensure state courts hear claims with only 
truly localized issues). 
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courts to adjudicate truly localized claims with truly localized harms.200  
Furthermore, toxic torts consider how certain strains of chemicals and 
substances impact the human body and the plaintiff must also prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s 
harm.201  Thus, a narrow view, such as the one the Ninth Circuit applied, 
does not provide an equitable or fair consideration to the rules because it 
does not take into consideration the nature of the environmental tort.202 
c. Just Right:  The Reasonable Fifth Circuit 
The Fifth Circuit’s holding in Denbury provided the most acceptable 
explanation of what defines a single event or occurrence.203  The Fifth 
Circuit held that because the environmental hazard was an ongoing 
pattern and each instance of that pattern was contextually connected, the 
events were all interconnected and could be viewed as one single event.204  
Unlike the Third and Ninth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit provided an 
interpretation of same event or occurrence language that is not too broad, 
nor too narrow.205  Starting with the same preliminary interpretation like 
the Third Circuit in Abraham, the Fifth Circuit further reasoned that an 
event can in fact be a continuing condition and is not limited to a single 
moment in time.206  Stopping with that interpretation would have created 
the same problem as the Third Circuit with an approach that was too 
broad; however, to eliminate the broad language in the CAFA, the Fifth 
Circuit also reasoned that because the events were contextually connected 
and when completed, created a related event, they could fall under the 
same event or occurrence.207 
                                                
200 See Allen, 784 F.3d at 627, 630, 632 (examining the abuse that occurs with class actions); 
see also Abraham, 719 F.3d at 274 (articulating why the Third Circuit affirmed the holding of 
the District Court). 
201 See Note, supra note 32, at 2261 (explaining that specific causation requires a plaintiff to 
prove the defendant caused the resulting harm). 
202 See Veron, supra note 44, at 647–48 (exploring toxic torts and their impacts on the 
litigation procedure due to their fact specific nature); see also Thompson, supra note 47, at 
249–50 (evaluating the issue of causation and how it relates to mass environmental torts). 
203 See infra Part IV.B (detailing the factors of the test proposed in Part IV.A). 
204 See Rainbow Gun Club, Inc. v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C., 760 F.3d 405, 409–11 (5th Cir. 
2014) (stating that ongoing patterns of conduct that are contextually connected are the same 
event or occurrence). 
205 See Abraham, 719 F.3d at 277 (holding that a continued release of a hazardous material 
is a single event, but providing no restraints on the rule); see also Allen, 784 F.3d at 629 
(limiting the phrase “same event or occurrence” to one single event, providing an approach 
that is too narrow). 
206 See Rainbow Gun Club, Inc., 760 F.3d at 412 (agreeing partially with the Third Circuit’s 
interpretation of the phrase “same event or occurrence”). 
207 See id. (believing that as long as the continuous events are contextually connected, the 
events arise out of the same event or occurrence). 
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By narrowing the approach of the Third Circuit, the Fifth Circuit 
eliminates the problem that defendants, who may not have any 
connection to the harm, are required to respond to the complaint and 
spend large sums of money to defend against claims that should have 
never been filed against them in the first place.208  In environmental toxic 
torts, courts face the problem of consolidating and aggregating individual 
litigants who may not have suffered the same harm as the rest of the 
class.209  This expedites potential exploitation of the judicial system and 
allows a plaintiff to receive more compensation than he or she actually 
deserves.210  Therefore, by further analyzing the problem to allow for 
continuing events that are contextually connected, the Fifth Circuit takes 
a broad interpretation and narrows it to the correct scheme without 
narrowing the problem too much.211 
One unique characteristic of environmental torts that current 
legislation does not acknowledge is a latency period.212  The latency period 
associated with toxic torts presents courts with a challenge in determining 
when the resulting harm occurs and what the resulting harm was.213  To 
balance both a vague and a narrow definition, this Note proposes a time 
frame of thirty years to bring a claim for an environmental harm.214  The 
defendant in the Denbury case properly asserted “[f]or the exception of the 
statute to have any real meaning, there must be a limit.”215  Thus, a 
                                                
208 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Corruption of the Class Action:  The New Technology of Collision, 80 
COR. L. REV. 851, 853 (taking the position that mass tort litigation is shifting from being 
favorable to plaintiffs to acting as a shield for defendants). 
209 See Shump v. Balka, 574 F.2d 1341, 1344 (10th Cir. 1978) (defining a consolidated claim); 
see also Eric Posner & Ariel Porat, Aggregation and Law, 7–22 (Jan. 2011), 
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1038&context=law_an
d_economics [https://perma.cc/6Q35-PCX7] (exploring the concept of aggregation in tort 
law).  Factual aggregation occurs when the issue is focused on whether the defendant 
committed a specific wrong at a certain time and place.  Posner & Porat, supra note 209, at 7. 
210 See Lahav, supra note 78, at 65–66 n.3 (analyzing small claims class actions, the issues 
surrounding the settlement phase of class actions, and recognizing class actions do not fit 
nicely within one narrow viewpoint). 
211 See Rainbow Gun Club, Inc., 760 F.3d at 413 (providing the holding of the Fifth Circuit by 
allowing events that are contextually connected to be deemed the same event or occurrence). 
212 See Lin, supra note 34, at 1441–42, 1445–46 (asserting that a latency period is common in 
toxic torts, and defining the latency period as a period of time between when the harm was 
suffered and when the results of that harm actually became apparent). 
213 See Wells, supra note 35, 288–90 nn.17, 22, 294 n.59 (evaluating the latency period of toxic 
torts). 
214 See Rainbow Gun Club, Inc., 760 F.3d at 409 (agreeing in part with the Third Circuit, but 
further interpreting the single local event exception as allowing continuing events that are 
contextually connected to be continuing events for the purpose of removal jurisdiction under 
the CAFA); see also Note, supra note 32, at 2261 (discussing the latency period of 
environmental torts). 
215 Rainbow Gun Club, Inc., 760 F.3d at 407. 
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definition of the same event or occurrence involving toxic torts needs to 
consider that the resulting harm may take years to appear, but an 
indefinite standard will not be beneficial, nor fair under tort public 
policy.216  The thirty-year period takes into consideration the latency 
period for the resulting harm in environmental torts and balances the 
interests of all the parties involved.217  As such, the standard proposed in 
this Note aims to further define and exemplify what is considered a 
contextually connected event, which enables a court to ensure that it is 
hearing the claims it has the authority to review.218  The proposed 
standard balances the Fifth Circuit’s holding with the unique 
characteristics of mass environmental torts to adopt a standard that is 
easily applicable by the federal courts.219 
Although the Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits and the drafters of the 
CAFA took a step in the right direction by trying to prevent the corruption 
that is characteristically present in mass actions, a clear standard must be 
created for the single local event exception and the same event or 
occurrence requirement.220  Therefore, a standard must be applied that 
will allow for a fair and equitable relief for the plaintiffs while taking into 
account the unique and specific nature of environmental torts.221  The 
SORT Test is offered as an aid to prevent any potential for corruption.222  
Environmental cases require a strong factual support for a finding of 
liability.223  Due to the specific nature of these claims, it is more 
challenging for the court to apply a rule that is too narrow or too broad, 
such as the Ninth Circuit’s ruling and the Third Circuit’s ruling.224  A 
factor test is the most appropriate because it gives the courts the discretion 
                                                
216 See infra Part IV (stating a unified standard for the same event or occurrence). 
217 See infra Part IV (providing the third factor within the SORT Test, which discusses a 
thirty-year-time period for multiple events to be the same event or occurrence); see also Wells, 
supra note 35, at 288–90 nn.17–22 (examining the time frame for the latency period). 
218 See Rainbow Gun Club, Inc., 760 F.3d at 409–11 (redefining the Third Circuit’s holding 
and requiring there be contextually connected events to be considered the same event, not 
just a continuing set of circumstances). 
219 See infra Part IV (proposing the unified standard for courts to adopt). 
220 See supra Part II.B (discussing the CAFA); see also supra Part II.C (analyzing the circuit 
split); infra Part IV (providing the four-factor-balancing test). 
221 See Note, supra note 32, at 2269 (stating the problems of causation and the plaintiff’s 
duty to allege the resulting harm); see also supra Part II.A (exemplifying the characteristics of 
the environmental torts). 
222 See infra Part IV (contributing a four-factor-balancing test for courts to apply when 
considering mass torts and the requirements of “same event or occurrence”). 
223 See Note, supra note 32, at 2269 (explaining the issue of causation and importance of 
causation as an element in proving liability for environmental torts). 
224 See supra Part III.A (considering the problem with the circuit splits and addressing the 
challenges and how to combat them). 
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to hear these cases while being considerate of the fact specific nature of 
each claim.225 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
Current legislation considering and regulating mass actions fails to 
consistently apply these overly vague discretionary standards to mass 
environmental torts.  As such, a consistent, clear standard for what the 
same event or occurrence constitutes must be provided to gives courts the 
appropriate amount of discretion, while providing clear guidelines that 
are understandable to all the parties involved.226  The current circuit split 
exists because there is no clear standard for courts to abide by when 
determining removal jurisdiction of mass environmental torts.227  
Therefore, courts need one succinct test to determine when a mass action 
arises out of the same event or occurrence and thus, is not removable to 
federal court.228  To begin, Part IV.A proposes the language and factor test 
that courts should utilize when evaluating the issue of removal 
jurisdiction for mass environmental torts.229  Then, Part IV.B explains each 
of the proposed factors and addresses any potential counterarguments 
that may arise when addressing these factors.230 
A. Proposed Factor Test  
To remove the mass confusion from removal jurisdiction of mass 
environmental torts, under the CAFA, the following four factors should 
be used by federal judges to determine when a mass environmental tort 
arises out of the same event or occurrence: 
The SORT Test 
 
Upon removal to federal court, a mass environmental 
claim may be remanded back to the state court, under the 
CAFA, if the claim falls under the single local event 
exception.  The single local event exception is met when 
the resulting harm from the environmental spill or 
                                                
225 See id. (addressing the problems with circuit splits). 
226 See supra Part III (advocating for the application of one cohesive and concise standard 
to the issue of removal jurisdiction for mass environmental torts). 
227 See Juenger, supra note 40, at 553–57 (identifying problems associated with circuit splits, 
such as inconsistent results and forum shopping). 
228 See infra Part IV.A (contributing a four-factor-balancing test for courts to evaluate when 
determining the issue of removal jurisdiction for mass environmental torts). 
229 See infra Part IV.A (proposing the SORT factor test). 
230 See infra Part IV.B (evaluating and discussing the factor test). 
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contamination arises under the same event or occurrence.  
When evaluating what is considered the same event or 
occurrence the court should balance the following four 
factors: 
 
1. Whether the resulting harm incurred by the plaintiffs 
originated from the same source; 
2. Whether the defendant had notice that the resulting 
harm could have occurred or was occurring;  
3. Whether each of the individual plaintiffs suffered 
similar resulting harms and are seeking similar relief; 
and 
4. Whether the period for the environmental 
catastrophe extended beyond thirty years.231 
B. Commentary 
Federal courts have failed to adequately resolve the discrepancy of the 
phrase “same event or occurrence” under the CAFA, which causes both 
economic strife among the parties and confusion within the court 
system.232  The inconsistent rulings do not provide a succinct holding 
applicable to future cases.233  As such, the current standard for same event 
                                                
231 The SORT Test is the contribution of the author.  The SORT Test gets its name from the 
four factors above:  same source, occurrence of the hazard, resulting harms, and time frame 
of thirty years.  See supra Part IV.A (proposing the four-factor-balancing test).  The first factor 
eliminates the problem of complex litigation involving multiple plaintiffs and defendants by 
ensuring that the defendants in the lawsuit actually caused the harm to the plaintiff.  See 
supra Part II.A.1 (considering that one characteristic of environmental torts is a complex 
litigation procedure that tends to involve multiple plaintiffs and defendants, that raises 
issues of causation, and questions whether the defendant actually caused all of the individual 
plaintiffs’ harms).  The second factor ensures that the plaintiffs are not being 
overcompensated or undercompensated for the harm that results, allowing for the public 
policy that tort victims should be fully compensated while balancing theories of equity.  See 
supra Part II.A.1 (providing a medical hypothetical in a footnote to model the concept that 
the resulting harm in one patient may not result in an identical harm of another patient).  The 
language of the third factor relies on the strict liability standard of toxic torts and ensures 
that defendants who could have prevented the injuries are responsible for the resulting 
harm.  See supra Part II.A.2 (evaluating the public policies of torts and applying them to toxic 
torts).  The final factor takes into account the specific nature of the environmental toxic torts 
and considers the possibility that the harm suffered by the plaintiff may appear as much as 
thirty years later.  See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the latency period surrounding 
environmental torts); see also Wells, supra note 35, at 288–90 nn.17, 22 (exploring the concept 
of the latency period). 
232 See ANDERSON & TRASK, supra note 73, at 3 (providing examples of the potential 
problems that may arise as a result of circuit splits). 
233 See Greer & Peyronnin, supra note 86, at 241–43 (stating a problem in the judicial system 
is that judges do not rule consistently). 
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or occurrence under the CAFA fails to provide clear removal guidelines 
for defendants.234  Thus, courts should adopt the four-factor SORT Test for 
determining when an event falls under the same event or occurrence 
exception, requiring the mass action to remain in state courts rather than 
federal courts.235  If adopted by the federal courts, the proposed factor test 
will resolve the circuit split, eliminate the confusion surrounding removal 
jurisdiction of mass torts, and remedy the vague language of the CAFA.236  
Using the proposed factor test, courts still have discretion, but are limited 
to the context and fact specific nature of the claims.237  By adopting the 
proposed test, federal judges will be able to adequately determine 
whether a claim is truly localized, eliminating the corruption associated 
with the removal of mass actions.238 
Nevertheless, critics may argue the legislature should apply and 
define this standard within the CAFA itself.239  However, this test strictly 
is limited to the unique nature of mass environmental torts.240  The CAFA 
is designed to discuss class actions and mass actions generally.241  This test 
is applicable for the purposes of mass environmental torts, which tend to 
be more narrowly viewed.242  Because mass environmental torts are very 
fact specific, the judges are in the best position to execute the proposed 
                                                
234 See supra Part III (exploring the problems with the current language of the single local 
event exception of the CAFA). 
235 See supra Part IV (suggesting the language for the SORT test). 
236 See supra Part IV.A (examining the SORT Test and providing the legal framework for 
its basis). 
237 See supra Part II.A (discussing only environmental toxic torts for the purpose of this 
Note). 
238 See ANDERSON & TRASK, supra note 73, at 3, 5 (analyzing how confusion can lead to 
corruption when litigating mass actions). 
239 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3) (2012) (stating that the federal court has the discretion to 
choose not to exercise jurisdiction over a mass action when more than one-third, but fewer 
than two-thirds, of the foreign state citizens and the primary defendants are also citizens of 
the forum state); see also § 1332(d)(4)(B) (requiring courts to decline jurisdiction if two-thirds 
or more of the class members and the primary defendants are citizens of the forum state); 
§ 1332(d)(4)(A) (stating that courts need to decline jurisdiction over a mass action when the 
principal injuries occurred in the forum state or where no similar class action involving any 
of the same defendants was filed during the three-year period before the filing of the 
complaint at issue). 
240 See Blomquist, supra note 47, at 25 (defining toxic torts and discussing their place in the 
judicial system). 
241 See § 1332(d) (addressing how class actions will be litigated and what constitutes a class 
action). 
242 See Lin, supra note 34, at 1445 (articulating how environmental torts tend to be more 
fact-specific, and thus, tend to have more narrow approaches to their interpretation of the 
resulting harm). 
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standard.243  Therefore, this standard is better implemented by the federal 
courts, rather than amending the enacted legislation.244 
Critics of this test may also argue that this test provides standards that 
are just as vague and confusing as the ones the courts previously 
provided.245  The purpose of this test is to provide unified factors for a 
judge to consider when presented with the issue of removing a mass 
environmental tort action to federal court.246  The test seeks to provide a 
balance between limiting the court’s authority to hear a claim and the fact 
specific nature of the claim.247  Thus, courts can use this standard as a 
stepping stone and look to other court cases to determine how best to 
apply the standard and use their discretion in the claim.248 
Furthermore, the proposed approach may allow parties seeking to 
bring a removal action to assist with the interpretation of the standard.249  
It is likely that from these standards, the parties themselves will be able to 
determine whether their claim is removable to federal court.250  There is 
no guarantee that adopting this test will deter frivolous lawsuits 
completely, but it may eliminate some of the unnecessary lawsuits by 
providing the parties with notice regarding how the court will interpret 
the defendant’s conduct for the purposes of the single local event 
exception of the CAFA.251 
                                                
243 See supra Part IV.A (giving the standard federal courts should adopt to resolve the 
vague language in the CAFA). 
244 See supra Part IV (arguing for the adoption of the SORT test by the courts). 
245 See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1972) (mitigating water pollution on a national 
scale); Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (1990) (suggesting a way to prevent oil spills); Clean 
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401(b), (c) (1963) (controlling air pollutants on a national scale); 
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1969) (promoting a safe and clean 
environment). 
246 See supra Part IV (providing the standard for courts to adopt). 
247 See Newman, supra note 48, at 512–13 (arguing for the need to balance legislative intent 
and respect the different branches of government). 
248 See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 554 (2014) (stating 
that there is no antiremoval presumption for a removal action of the CAFA); see also Benko 
v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 789 F.3d 1111, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2015) (allowing the plaintiffs to 
remove the case to federal court); Mondragon v. Capital One Auto Fin., 736 F.3d 880, 882 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (discussing the diversity of citizenship requirement under the CAFA); Coleman v. 
Estes Express Lines, Inc., 631 F.3d 1010, 1020 (9th Cir. 2011) (remanding the case back to state 
court since the requirements of the CAFA were not met). 
249 See Newman, supra note 48, at 513 (raising the issues of circuit splits and stating how 
judges’ opinions are highly regarded, and thus, circuit splits should be resolved for that 
purpose). 
250 See id. (discussing when a party is able to weigh the risks and benefits of litigating a 
claim). 
251 See supra Part III.A (arguing how the current circuit split does not create one cohesive 
standard). 
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While critics may also argue that this factor test appears to disfavor 
defendants and big corporations, such as BP, this test does not prohibit 
claims to be heard in federal court.252  The purpose and goal of the SORT 
Test is to ensure that removal issues for mass environmental torts are 
interpreted on the same level, which is beneficial for both parties.253  
Furthermore, the SORT Test is necessary, whether or not it tends to favor 
one party over another, because these types of environmental cases tend 
to impact more than just one individual, but also surrounding 
communities.254  Resolving this issue for the purposes of public policy has 
a greater interest than providing one party a forum it finds more 
favorable.255  Finally, if applying this test creates a result that is 
unfavorable, the parties still have the option of settlement, which is 
encouraged by the courts.256 
Finally, critics may also argue the factors are too similar to F.R.C.P. 23, 
which was not successful in regulating class actions originally, resulting 
in the ratification of the CAFA.257  While the factors found in F.R.C.P. 23 
appear on its face to be similar to the SORT Test, contextually they are 
very different.258  F.R.C.P. 23 only applies to class actions.259  This Note 
considers the characteristics of mass actions, which is a type of class action, 
and these factors are focused solely on the claims of mass actions.260  More 
specifically, these factors seek to resolve a problem with mass actions in 
environmental law.261  F.R.C.P. 23, like the CAFA, only looks at class 
                                                
252 See supra Part IV.A (providing the SORT Test and explaining how the four factors are 
to be used when evaluating the issue of removal jurisdiction for mass environmental torts). 
253 See Beim & Rader, supra note 97, at 1 (indicating some of the problems associated with 
circuit splits); see also ANDERSON & TRASK, supra note 73, at 3, 5 (stating the issues that can 
result due to circuit splits). 
254 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 579 (1993) (exemplifying a 
situation where an environmental catastrophe had a detrimental impact on the surrounding 
community). 
255 See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 7–9 (listing the twelve tort public policies applicable to 
tort law); see supra Part II.A.2 (categorizing nine of the general tort public policies and 
applying them to mass environmental torts). 
256 See Greer & Peyronnin, supra note 86, 240–43 (discussing how it is currently more 
challenging to manage proposed settlements in circuit splits and class actions). 
257 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B) (2012) (evaluating the history of the CAFA taking into 
consideration the F.R.C.P. regarding removal of class actions). 
258 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (explaining class actions under the F.R.C.P.). 
259 Compare § 1332(d)(11)(A) (defining a class action), with FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (providing 
the guidelines that are required to have a class action under the F.R.C.P.); but see 
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (explaining when a mass action is deemed a class action). 
260 See supra Part II.B (explaining the difference between a class action and a mass action). 
261 See supra Part II.A (focusing solely on environmental torts and toxic tort litigation). 
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actions from a broad and general perspective.262  Therefore, the two tests, 
while similar on their face, relate to two different types of actions.263 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Note established the significant and dire need for a clear standard 
for the single local event exception under the CAFA.  The proposed test 
will resolve the current confusion and discrepancies of what constitutes a 
single event for the purposes of removal jurisdiction.  Without a unified 
standard for mass actions for federal courts to adopt, courts will spend 
both time and money litigating issues that could have easily been 
resolved.  Thus, courts should adopt the proposed factor test to facilitate 
the already hectic litigation process for both the plaintiff and the 
defendant.  The SORT test will promote tort public policy, diminish 
corruption associated with complex litigation procedures, and allow for 
the return of consistent judgments. 
In the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, if each of the private beachfront 
property owners were to bring a mass action claim against BP, under the 
SORT test, they would be able to keep their claim in state court.  BP would 
not be able to prove through the SORT test that the harm these property 
owners incurred arose out of different and separate events.  Thus, their 
claim would be one that arises out of the same event or occurrence under 
the CAFA and would be able to be remanded back to state court under the 
single local event exception.  The SORT Test will help judges consistently 
adjudicate claims similar to the ones brought against BP. 
Kirsten Z. Myers 
                                                
262 See § 1332(d)(1)(B) (discussing class action lawsuits and determining how mass actions 
are applicable to class actions lawsuits). 
263 See supra Part II.B (analyzing the CAFA and the F.R.C.P.). 
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